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CERN	 researcher,	 listed	numerous	 training	events:	 the	majority	was	 focused	on	 specialized	 scientific	 and	
technologic	subjects,	relevant	to	the	projects’	aim	–	scintillators,	laser	lithography,	single-photon	imaging.	
However,	a	 relevant	part	of	 the	trainings	was	going	to	be	devoted	to	non-technical	 topics:	management,	
marketing	and	sales,	certification	of	medical	products,	intellectual	property	rights;	one	of	them	was	named	




The	 project,	 coordinated	 by	 CERN,	 was	 geared	 at	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 endeavours	 of	
fundamental	physics	–	including,	alongside	basic	research,	the	development	of	cutting-edge	technologies	for	
particle	detectors	–	and	the	application	of	the	same	technologies	to	real-life	important	issues:	in	this	case,	





involving	 complex	 interplays	 among	 the	partners	 –	 eleven	academia	and	 companies,	 distributed	over	 six	
European	 countries.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I	 had	 to	 study	 the	 project	 contents,	 observe	 the	 researchers’	
activities	and	find	the	most	appropriate	ways	to	communicate	them	to	the	public.	My	working	place	was	a	





















Unravelling	 the	 tangle	 of	 European	 research	 policy	 landscape,	 features	 and	 framing	would	 have	
formed	the	subject	of	my	subsequent	PhD	research.	
The evolving nature of science 
The	features	of	EU	research	policy	evolved	against	the	background	of	wider	transformations	occurred	
in	the	conceptualization	of	science	and	of	its	role	in	public	policies.		
The evolving understanding of science. During	the	last	century,	not	only	the	involvement	of	scientific	
research	 in	 national	 policies	 radically	 changed,	 but	 the	 same	understanding	 of	 the	 scientific	 activity	was	
questioned	and	discussed.	
The	vision	that	science	students	learn	at	University	usually	dates	back	to	the	19th	century	model	of	
“academic	 science”	 (Ziman,	 2000),	 when	 research	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 professional	 scientists	 inside	
universities,	and	the	scientific	community	was	self-governing	by	means	of	internal	procedures,	specific	social	
interplays	 and	 a	 set	 of	 norms	 and	 values	 founding	 the	 scientific	 activity.	 R.K	 Merton	 identified	 these	
principles,	underlying	 the	ethos	of	modern	 science,	 in	 communalism,	universalism,	disinterestedness	and	
organized	scepticism2:	the	scientist	produces	public	knowledge,	accessible	to	everybody	(communalism);	no	
social	 or	 political	 condition	 influences	 the	 validity	 of	 science	 (universalism);	 researchers	 don’t	 pursue	








World	 War.	 The	 new	 scientific	 ethos	 connoting	 the	 “post-academic”	 era	 was	 identified	 by	 qualities	















no	 longer	be	viewed	as	autonomous,	self-governed	sectors,	but	continuously	 interacting	social	 realms,	 in	
constant	mutual	 reshaping.	The	attention	payed	 to	 the	deep	embodiment	of	 science	 in	 society	has	been	
interpreted	principally	 in	two	main	directions:	to	advocate	more	participation	of	society	in	the	shaping	of	
















The	 appropriate	 features	 of	 scientific	 activity,	 in	 a	 context	 denoted	by	 a	 diffused	mistrust	 in	 the	
capacity	of	knowledge	to	advance	certainties	and	control	over	the	natural	world,	have	to	be,	according	to	
Silvio	 Funtowicz	 and	 Jerome	 Ravetz	 (Funtowicz	 &	 Ravetz,	 1993),	 «based	 on	 the	 assumptions	 of	
unpredictability,	 incomplete	 control,	 and	 a	 plurality	 of	 legitimate	 perspectives»,	 transcending	 the	 «old	







methods	 and	 cultures	 in	 the	 scientific	 activity:	 scholars	 discussed	 about	 an	 “asymmetrical	 convergence”	
between	academia	and	industry:	universities	adopt	business-like	tenets	and	organization,	while	businesses	
absorb	some	practices	of	the	scientific	community.	The	“triple	helix”	model	(Etzkowitz	&	Leydesdorff,	2000)	
interpreted	 innovation	 as	 produced	by	 the	 interplay	 of	 industry,	 university	 and	 government;	 universities	
would	 be,	 moreover,	 called	 to	 a	 “third	 mission”,	 alongside	 the	 two	 traditional	 ones	 of	 teaching	 and	
researching,	consisting	in	the	diffusion	of	knowledge	through	industrial	enterprises,	public	communication	
and	expert	consultancy.	
The rightful place of science.	Against	this	convoluted	conceptual	landscape,	the	understanding	of	the	
role	of	knowledge	production	in	public	policies	changed	completely:	governments	shifted	from	a	substantial	












6	President	Obama	pronounced	 it	during	his	 first	 inaugural	speech	 in	2009	(Obama,	2009):	«We'll	 restore	science	to	 its	
rightful	place,	and	wield	technology's	wonders	to	raise	health	care's	quality	and	lower	its	cost.		We	will	harness	the	sun	and	the	winds	







Why studying conceptual frames in European science policies? 





My	attention	 is	 focused	primarily	on	discourses:	 studying	 the	European	 research	policy-making,	 I	
soon	 realized	 the	 recurrence	of	 specific	mind-sets,	or	 frames,	 in	which	 the	policies	were	 inserted	and	by	
which	decisions	were	legitimised.	«Conceptual	frameworks»	is	one	denomination	among	the	numerous	by	
which	 the	 social,	 anthropological,	 political	 and	 science	 studies	 literatures	 (reviewed	 in	 the	 paragraph	
Disclosing	Discourses)	have	identified	powerful	shared	worldviews,	able	to	make	sense	of	a	community	past	
events	and	 to	point	 the	direction	 for	 future	developments.	 These	 frames	have	an	 influential	prescriptive	
effect:	they	distinguish	among	actors	and	issues,	identifying	the	most	relevant	ones;	they	define	the	horizon	
of	 acceptable	 actions,	 and	 establish	 the	 reference	 values	 and	 norms;	 they	 determine	 the	 choice	 criteria	
among	different	policy	options.		
Their	importance	is	even	more	pronounced	in	a	political	entity	like	the	European	Union,	where	the	
weakness	 of	 political	 debate	 doesn’t	 allow	 the	 identification	 of	 clear	 political	 positions	 and	 strong	
responsibilities	over	decisions,	and	–	at	least	in	the	field	of	knowledge	policies	–	abiding	reference	is	made	
to	previous	strategies	and	documents	in	order	to	legitimise	choices	and	actions.	
Every discourse is inextricable from the process producing it.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 importance	 of	
policy	frames,	which	form	the	main	subject	of	this	work9,	every	discourse	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	context	
in	which	 it	 is	produced:	 for	 this	 reason,	my	 first	 concern	was	understanding	 the	European	policy-making	
procedure	in	the	field	of	scientific	research.		









I	 traced	 the	 procedure	 leading	 to	 the	 approval	 of	 FPs	 throughout	 the	 European	 institutions,	
identifying	 the	 stages	 when	 conceptual	 frames	 are	 developed	 and	 incorporated	 into	 documents,	 and	
explored	the	actors	involved	in	shaping	scientific	policies.	In	so	doing,	I	couldn’t	rely	on	comprehensive	guides	
describing	 the	European	scientific	policy	making:	a	proper	 shared	 reference	 literature,	 to	my	knowledge,	
doesn’t	exist;	I	undertook,	hence,	an	exploration	of	the	fragmented	corpus	of	information	available	both	in	
institutional	 documents	 and	 in	 EU	 policy-making	 literature	 (where	 usually	 science	 policies	 appear	 as	
examples	or	minor	sectors);	alongside,	I	had	the	chance	to	interview	some	actors	involved	in	the	process,	
and	to	obtain	from	them	the	details	of	the	procedure	and	the	evaluation	of	their	experience10.	
Science policies and European integration.	Analysing	the	historical	evolution	of	European	research	




I	 traced	 the	 history	 of	 EU	 research	 policy	 since	 the	 Communities	 foundation,	 in	 the	 ‘50s,	with	 a	
particular	 attention	 on	 highlighting	 the	 ‘phase	 transitions’	 between	 periods	 denoted	 by	 different	
understandings	of	the	role	and	purpose	of	research	(in	the	section	Which	science	for	which	Europe?).	The	
features	of	the	current	vision	are	clearly	grounded	to	its	historical	development.	






states	 (Frenk,	 Hunt,	 Partridge,	 Thornton,	 &	Wyatt,	 2015;	Maes	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 However,	 a	 great	 share	 of	
national	funds	is	invested	in	salaries	and	in	ordinary	expenditures	for	research	infrastructures;	conversely,	
EU	 funds	 are	 usually	 targeted	 directly	 at	 financing	 research	 projects,	 so	 their	 relevance	 for	 researchers’	
activity	is	increasingly	notable.	
The	 impact	 on	 national	 funding	 is	 not	 the	 only	 influence	 of	 EU	 research	 policy:	 the	 tenets	 and	
conceptual	frames	developed	and	promoted	by	the	Union	in	the	field	of	knowledge	policies,	in	fact,	filter	to	







Reading between the lines of policy documents.	 The	aim	of	 this	work	 is	 to	 identify	and	expose	 the	













In	 contemporary	 knowledge	 societies,	 knowledge	 is	 considered	 the	 basis	 of	 social,	 political	 and	
economic	 relations:	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 policy	 frames	 highlights	 a	 series	 of	 critical	 points	 related	 to	 the	
coexistence	 of	 diverse,	 competing,	 visions	 of	 knowledge	 production.	 The	 tensions	 among	 different	
legitimising	values	and	orientations,	which	emerge	manifestly	in	political	discourses	and	–	as	described	in	the	



















changing	 fortunes,	 rivalled	 by	 the	 notions	 of	 «power»,	 «interests»,	 or	 «rational	 choice»;	 however,	 it	 is	
currently	regaining	attention	on	the	thrust	of	the	«argumentative»,	«interpretive»	or	«cognitive»	turns	in	
social	and	political	sciences.	
Shared	narratives	 are	not	 simple	 “stories”:	 they	at	once	are	 shaped	and	 contribute	 to	 shape	 the	
society	in	which	they	are	originated.	On	one	side,	then,	they	can	be	analysed	in	search	of	the	values,	actors	




imposing	 classifications,	 legitimating	 actors,	 distinguishing	 issues	 from	 non-issues.	When	 adopted	 in	 the	
public	arena,	they	often	influence,	as	choice	criteria,	important	decisions.	























socio-political	 structures.	 Such	 a	 shift	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 development,	 in	 the	 late	 XIX	 and	 early	 XX	
century,	of	new	philosophies	emphasizing	the	role	of	interpretation	and	subjective	experience,	opposing	to	
the	prevailing	posivist	 approaches	 to	 social	 and	political	 phenomena;	Hermeneutics	 and	Phenomenology	
schools	 in	 particular	 were	 influential	 for	 policy	 analysis	 (Yanow,	 2007).	 The	 primacy	 of	 structure	 over	
individuals	argued	by	the	structuralist	school	furthermore	prompted	the	reflections	on	the	collective	cultural	




In	 this	context,	 I	am	specifically	 interested	to	the	conceptual	 frames	adopted	 in	public	discourses	
about	scientific	policy	by	the	European	Union,	and	to	how	these	have	influenced	the	interpretation	of	past	
events	 and	 determine	 future	 developments.	 The	 visions	 we	 are	 concerned	 with	 have	 been	 named	 and	
described	 in	a	variety	of	ways,	according	 to	 the	 features	 that	 the	author	 intended	 to	emphasize	and	 the	













Moscovici,	 who	 proposed	 the	 term	 «social	 representations»	 (1961)	 to	 identify	 the	 specific	 forms	 that	
knowledge	takes	when	expressed	by	the	society	or	by	groups	therein,	and	that	are	often	shared	as	“common	
sense”	 ideas.	They	are	evolving	 structures,	dynamically	 related	with	phenomena,	 that	 they	 interpret	and	
process	 in	 order	 to	 organize	 the	 reality	 and	 let	 the	members	 of	 the	 group	 to	 behave	 and	 communicate	
effectively	(Palmonari,	Cavazza,	&	Rubini,	2012).	






scientific	effort	 is	 simply	an	accumulation	of	knowledge,	he	 identifies	 in	 the	history	of	 science	periods	of	
«normal	 science»,	 when	 scientists	 work	 to	 accumulate	 and	 consolidate	 knowledge	 coherently	 with	 a	
paradigm,	 and	 «scientific	 revolutions»,	 which	 change	 the	 overall	 world	 view	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 new,	 often	
incompatible,	 one.	 Paradigms	are,	 hence,	 the	 set	 of	 theories,	 rules,	 procedures	 commonly	 accepted	 and	
practiced	by	a	scientific	community,	and	revolutions	point	the	change	of	paradigms.		
(…)	 some	 accepted	 examples	 of	 actual	 scientific	 practice	 —	 examples	 which	 include	 law,	 theory,	
application,	and	 instrumentation	together	—	provide	models	 from	which	spring	particular	coherent	




















and	 in	 the	 element	 of	 what	 positivity,	 ideas	 could	 appear,	 sciences	 be	 established,	 experience	 be	








Institutions,	 according	 to	 them,	 need	 to	 be	 explained	 and	 justified:	 this	 happens	 through	 linguistic	























knowledge	as	 an	emancipatory	 instrument,	 favouring	 the	progress	 and	 freedom	of	mankind,	 the	 second	
promoting	disinterested,	pure	knowledge.	These	conceptual	frames	could	not	only	explain,	but	legitimate	
knowledge:	when	intersecting	with	society,	they	were	able	to	make	sense	of	historical	developments	and	
justify	 existing	 power	 relations	 and	 traditions.	 One	 of	 the	 peculiar	 features	 of	 such	 master	 narratives,	
underlined	by	Lyotard,	 is	 the	shift	 from	description	to	prescription:	metanarratives,	 in	 this	sense,	are	not	
simple	stories	because	they	have	a	prescriptive	nature;	unlike	pure	denotative	discourses,	they	position	in	
the	 range	 of	 values	 and	 are	 able	 to	 influence	 individual	 choices	 and	 societal	 developments.	 Lyotard’s	
judgement	on	métarécits	was	clear:	these	are	to	be	considered	instruments	of	oppression,	because	they	tend	
to	be	all-encompassing,	excluding	any	other	vision	and	working	to	reinforce	power	structures.		
Metanarratives	 are	 described	 as	 very	 comprehensive	 systems	 of	 long-term	 historical	 meaning-
making,	totalitarian	in	their	effect	of	foreclosing	alternatives;	Kuhn’s	«paradigms»	play	an	analogous	role	in	
the	more	 restricted	arena	of	 the	 scientific	 community;	 Foucault’s	«epistemes»	 represent	 the	historical	a	
priori	of	 knowledge.	These	 ideas	 can	be	 regarded	as	 the	most-encompassing	 connotations	of	 conceptual	




changes,	 and	 less	 comprehensive:	 different	 policy	 discourses	 can	 coexist,	 and	 the	 confrontation	on	 such	














frame	 conflicts	 that	underlie	 controversies».	 This	process	might	not	 lead	directly	 to	 resolution	but	 could	
creatively	modify	the	conflict	and	open	up	communication	channels.	«Action	frames»,	or	frames	underlying	





1994).	Frames	do	not	erase	 the	 importance	of	 interests,	but	 they	concur	 in	defining	 the	different	actors’	




to	 recognize	 each	 actor’s	 own	 frame	 from	 inside,	 and	 hence	 there	 is	 no	 possibility	 of	 any	 unbiased	
reconstruction	of	others’	frames.	The	authors	anyway	analyse	different	policy	conflicts	and	design	several	
processes	 that	 can	 help	 reducing	 the	 incommunicability	 across	 frames,	 possibly	 leading	 to	 the	 conflict	
mitigation,	especially	at	the	practical	level:	Schön	and	Rein’s	reasoning,	as	already	mentioned,	is	particularly	
oriented	to	real	policy	practice.			














which	«people	–	 including	opponents	 –	 reach	and	 justify	mutually	 acceptable	decisions»,	 embracing	«an	
understanding	 of	 human	 action	 as	 intermediated	 and	 embedded	 in	 symbolically	 rich	 social	 and	 cultural	
contexts»	 (Fischer	&	Gottweis,	 2012).	Drawing	 from	Habermas’	 reflections	on	 communicative	action	and	










means	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 audience;	 although	 in	 common	 language	 rhetoric	 has	 acquired	 a	 negative	
connotation,	it	is	an	essential	aspect	of	argumentation,	aiming	at	constructing	a	«particular	representation	
of	reality»	focused	on	the	audience,	instead	than	on	the	object	itself.	
While	 rhetoric	 is	 a	 specific	 facet	 of	 argumentation,	 a	 «discourse»	 is	 a	 more	 general	 concept,	
pertaining	 to	 «a	 body	 of	 concepts	 and	 ideas	 that	 circumscribe,	 influence	 and	 shape	 argumentation»;	 a	
discourse,	then,	is	a	set	of	ideas,	concepts	and	categories	that	constitute	the	reference	world	view	and	to	










reconstructed	 and	 related	 orally	 or	 in	 written	 form	 to	 other	 people.	 Narratives	 are	 then,	 stricto	 sensu,	
contained	inside	discourses.			





with	 the	 Maastricht	 Treaty,	 that	 revamped	 the	 discussion	 about	 the	 European	 legitimacy.	 Before	 that	
moment,	the	traditional	approaches	in	EU	studies	had	analysed	the	dynamics	of	interests	as	the	prevailing	




that	 some	 «paradigms»	 (a	 concept	 drawn	 from	 Kuhn’s	 works)	 prevailed	 on	 others	 when	 these	 were	
promoted	in	institutional	contexts	like	universities	and	think	tanks	and	shared	by	influencing	groups.	Within	
the	 academic	 community	 of	 the	 European	 studies,	 however,	 Borrás	 recognized	 different	 level	 of	
commitment,	 distinguishing	 between	 strong	 cognitivists	 –	 who	 argue	 for	 a	 substantial	 constructivist	
approach,	 emphasizing	 the	essential	 embeddedness	of	 actors	 in	 their	 societal	 context,	 and	opposing	 the	
rational	choice	or	interest	bargaining	understandings	of	policy	processes	–	and	weak	cognitivists	–	who	are	











According	 to	 the	 authors,	 socio-technical	 imaginaries	 connect	 the	 socio-political	 theorizations	 of	
collective	 imaginations	and	 the	complex,	but	«politically	neutered»	descriptions	of	hybrid	 socio-technical	
systems	in	in	STS	(Science	and	Technology	Studies).	Socio-technical	imaginaries,	they	argue,	are	distinct	from	
the	aforementioned	political	conceptualizations,	and	from	other	commonly	related	notions:	 they	are	 less	
monolithic	 than	master	 narratives,	 more	 connected	 to	 imagination	 than	 ideologies,	 wider	 in	 scope	 and	













and	Kim	highlighted	 in	 their	description,	drawing	 from	the	work	of	 the	political	 scientist	Yaron	Ezrahi	on	
contemporary	democracies	and	the	contribution	of	science	and	technology	to	them	as	a	continuous	public,	
and	legitimating,	demonstration	of	power	(Ezrahi,	1990,	2012).	In	the	shift	to	post-modern	democracies,	he	
argues,	 the	 founding	 myths	 of	 modern	 democracies	 –	 natural	 law,	 autonomous	 individual,	 rationality,	
progress,	 faith	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 consensus	 based	 on	 scientific	 facts	 –	 are	 eroding,	 showing	 the	
«bottomlessness»	of	power	structures.	New	political	metaphors,	he	asserts,	refer	no	more	to	the	«machine»,	
but	to	the	«theater»,	and	the	political	performance	of	leaders	is	of	increasing	importance.	In	order	to	avoid	








than	 the	 other	 more	 traditional	 notions	 of	 myths,	 ideas	 and	 political	 knowledge,	 in	 that	 they	 link	 the	
«normative,	cognitive,	and	emotional	components	of	politics»	(Ezrahi,	2012,	pp.	7–8):	
(…)	 the	 imagination	 is	 probably	 the	most	 neglected	 form	of	 power	 in	 the	 field	 of	modern	 political	
science	and,	in	particular,	political	theory.	One	of	my	main	concerns	is	with	the	question	of	how	the	
restoration	of	the	imagination	to	its	rightful	place	in	our	understanding	of	politics	could	and	should	
affect	 political	 theory,	 political	 arguments,	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 our	 interpretations	 of	 political	
practice.	It	 is	because	the	political	imagination	is	indispensable	to	the	creation	of	the	political	order	
while	also	inherently	dangerous	to	its	very	stability	that	it	constantly	problematizes	the	political.	




enabling	 tolerance	 for	 the	 incoherences,	 ambiguities,	 and	 compromises	 that	 are	 inescapable	 in	 any	
government	by	the	people»	(Ezrahi,	2012,	p.	320).		
Conceptual frameworks.	While	for	Ezrahi	political	fictions	should	not	only	be	criticized,	but	regarded	
as	 necessary	 elements	 of	 any	 real	 political	 systems,	 the	 political	 scientist	 Benoit	 Godin,	 in	 his	 work	 on	























Meaning-making, prescriptive, structuring, tacit: discourses and conceptual frameworks.	 All	 the	





able	 to	 define	 social	 relations,	 to	 legitimize	 institutions	 and	 power	 relations,	 and	 to	 define	 the	 relevant	
23	
predominantly	 hidden,	 tacitly	 referred	 to	 in	 debates	 and	 only	 rarely	 brought	 to	 the	 surface	 of	 public	
confrontation.	 Furthermore,	 they	 don’t	 need	 to	 be	 demonstrated,	 they	 are	 self-legitimizing,	 with	 the	
consequence	 of	 appearing	 hardly	 contestable	 from	 the	 inside	 and	 possibly	 reaching	 the	 extreme	
consequence	of	working	as	totalitarian	ideologies.	
When	dealing	with	the	European	scientific	policy	documents,	we	are	naturally	not	expecting	to	find	
all-encompassing	 structures	 like	 Lyotard’s	 metanarratives,	 Foucault’s	 epistemes	 or	 Kuhn’s	 paradigms:	
however,	 these	 are	 powerful	 reference	 concepts	 (and	 guides	 for	 understanding)	 when	 researching	 sub-
universal	thought	systems	with	analogous	interpretive	and	prescriptive	effects.	
In	 the	 following,	 I	 will	 analyse	 the	 incorporation	 of	 thought	 structures	 in	 politically	 relevant	
documents	of	science	policy:	the	key	operational	references	will	be	the	notions	of	discourses,	as	described	
by	 Fischer	 and	Gottweis,	 and	of	 conceptual	 frameworks,	 as	 developed	by	Godin	 (after	 Schön	 and	Rein’s	
frames).	 In	 fact,	 these	 approaches	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 interpret	 (and	 possibly	 help	 solving)	 policy	
controversies	 and	 are	 particularly	 suitable	 to	 analyse	 documents	 that	 represent	 the	written	 outcome	 of	
political	negotiations,	like	the	Commission	ones,	and	position	papers	developed	with	the	aim	of	being	used	















Unravelling the policy-making tangle: the actors’ experiences and the 
documents’ conceptual foundations 
A	complex	institution’s	process	of	policy	design	is	never	a	simple,	technical,	procedure:	it	embodies	




Exploring	 European	 policy	 discourses	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 conceptual	 frames	 on	 knowledge	
production	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 demanding	 objective,	 both	 in	 the	 phases	 of	 discourses	 analysis	 and	 for	 the	
previous	necessary	stage	of	context	recollection.	
The	main	 instrument	 I	decided	to	adopt	 for	 the	exploration	of	conceptual	 frameworks	and	policy	
narratives	was	documental	analysis:	European	Union	is	characterised	by	a	remarkably	prolific	production	of	
documents	of	different	types	and	scopes	which	is	very	often	the	prominent	medium	by	which	the	community	
exchanges	 information	 internally,	 between	 the	 institutional	 bodies,	 and	 with	 the	 Member	 States,	 the	
involved	 stakeholders	 and	 the	 citizens.	 Although	 complemented	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 communication	 –	
meetings	 and	 workshops,	 consultations,	 and,	 most	 recently,	 audio-visuals	 –	 documents	 represent	 the	
preferred	 instrument	 by	 which	 the	 European	 Union	 communicates	 formally	 its	 political	 positions	 and	
developments.	Furthermore,	EU	documents	are	frequently	regarded	as	the	reference	for	the	development	
of	subsequent	policies,	both	at	the	European	and	at	the	national	levels.		
Since	 every	 document	 is	 a	 «situated	 product»	 (De	 Lillo	 &	 Arosio,	 2010;	 Prior,	 2003),	 inevitably	
connected	with	the	context	in	which	it	was	produced,	the	first	period	of	my	research	was	devoted	to	the	
study	of	European	policy-making	in	the	scientific	field.	To	understand	the	formal	and	informal	stages	of	the	
process	and	 investigate	 the	 role	and	 involvement	of	 the	 relevant	actors,	 I	 realized	a	 small	 group	of	pilot	
interviews	to	people	chosen	for	 their	 institutional	positioning	along	the	policy-design	chain,	 from	which	 I	
obtained	 information	 on	 the	 details	 of	 the	 procedure,	 especially	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 production	 of	
documents,	as	well	as	interesting	insights	on	the	interviewees’	personal	experiences	and	their	evaluations	of	
the	European	research	policy.		
How does European scientific policy-making work? Pilot interviews to stakeholders 
and policy-design actors 
To	understand	 the	 context	 in	which	 the	policy	documents	were	produced,	 I	 needed	 to	 trace	 the	
European	 policy-making	 process	 in	 the	 scientific	 field.	 Alongside	 written	 accounts	 of	 policy	 scholars,	
describing	the	EU	procedure	in	general	terms	(e.g.	Borrás	et	al.,	2009;	 	Princen,	2011;	Wallace,	Pollack,	&	






obtain	 an	 evaluation	 of	 their	 experience	 inside	 the	 process.	 They	 could,	 in	 other	 words,	 describe	 the	
landscape	of	EU	research	funding	programmes	and	instruments	in	which	the	policy	documents	are	produced,	
evaluate	the	processes	and	political	dynamics	they	identified	and	provide	a	significant	diachronic	account,	










The interviewees’ positions in the policy-design process.	The	choice	of	the	interviewees	was	primarily	
connected	with	their	institutional	task:	they	all	shared	the	feature	of	playing	a	role	in	the	European	process	
of	policy	development,	particularly	at	the	crucial	stage	of	policy-design.	
Studying	 the	process,	 I	mapped	 the	 formal	 groups	 involved	 in	 the	definition	of	 research	policies,	
focusing	especially	on	the	phase	of	policy-shaping	centred	around	the	Commission,	taking	place	before	the	
policy	 proposal	 is	 submitted	 to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	Council	 for	 the	 formal	 legislative	 procedure.	 The	
majority	of	policy	documents	are	produced	along	this	policy-shaping	chain,	whose	principal	actors	are	listed,	


















































the	 first	 are	more	 involved	 in	 the	 first	 phases	 and	 can	 actually	 orient	 the	 policies,	 the	 second	 group	 is	
consulted	at	later	stages	and	usually	provides	inputs	on	the	details	concerning	their	specific	interest	field.	
Fig.	1	schematically	depicts	the	‘layers’	I	recognised	around	the	Commission	Directorates	–	the	main	actor	of	
policy-shaping	–	distinguished	according	 to	 their	different	 involvement	with	 the	process.	The	 inner	 circle	
represents	the	Commission	offices	in	Brussels,	where	the	development	of	the	policies	is	organised,	the	inputs	
collected	 and	 the	 policy	 documents	 committed	 or	 realised;	 the	 external	 one	 depicts	 the	 position	 of	 the	




intermediate	actors,	mainly	 stakeholders	and	knowledge	brokers,	and	 it	 is	distinguished	 into	 two	 further	
layers:	the	darker	one,	where	some	of	the	actors	more	involved	with	Brussels	offices	are	listed,	and	the	light-
grey	one,	where	the	remaining	ones	are	included.	























































































third	 countries).	 Their	 role	 is	 to	 provide	 information,	 guidance	 and	 support	 to	 all	 the	 participants	 and	
potential	 applicants	 to	 the	 Programme;	 they	 are	 nominated	 by	 national	 governments,	 but	 they	 interact	







showed	 to	 be	 interested	 in	 reconstructing	 the	 complete	 landscape	 of	 research	 policies	 design,	 which,	
however,	none	of	 them	showed	to	grasp	completely	–	nobody	could	answer	to	the	 final	question	on	the	
political	responsibility	of	European	scientific	policy	decisions.	




with	 the	 European	 policy-making	 in	 the	 scientific	 field	 and	 their	 knowledge	 and	 evaluation	 of	 scientific	
research	in	Europe.	The	first	focus	was	stimulated	by	means	of	examples	of	 involvement	in	the	process	–	
their	eventual	 contacts	with	policy-makers,	 their	employment	as	advisors,	or	 their	participation	 to	policy	
negotiations	 on	 R&D	 issues	 –	 and	 further	 explored	 asking	 for	 the	 details	 of	 their	 experience,	 their	




and	 about	 their	 experience	of	 the	historical	 and	 ideational	 development	of	 European	R&D	programmes:	
conceptual	origins,	 turning	points,	 instruments	 comparisons.	The	 interview	usually	was	 concluded	with	a	
question	on	their	opinion	on	where,	and	by	whom,	the	fundamental	decisions	on	research	policy	ideation	
and	development	were	taken.	
The	 description	 of	 the	 policy-making	 process	 reported	 in	 section	 The	 EU	decision-making	 process(es)	 for	




How does Europe talk about science? The choice and analysis of the policy documents 
Political	discourses	are	interesting	sources	to	analyse	the	dynamics	of	every	political	entity:	policy	
documents	are	even	more	important	in	a	context	like	the	EU	where	the	internal	political	debate	is	weaker	







the	 EU	 documental	 repository	 online	 gives	 75704	 results15),	 especially	 if	 the	 analysis	 is	 intended	 to	 be	
conducted	qualitatively,	and	only	for	a	tiny	part	by	means	of	computing	instruments.		
The choice of the documents.	 All	 the	 analysed	 documents	 were	 institutional	 public	 documents,	
diffused	by	the	European	bodies	and	available	in	public	repositories:	hence,	all	the	documents	were	drafted	
and	 circulated	 to	 express	 an	 official	 vision,	 even	 though	 time-	 and	 context-dependent,	 belonging	 to	 EU	
institutions	about	specific	aspects	related	to	research	policy.	
The	prime	criterion	employed	in	the	choice	was	the	importance	ascribed	to	policy	documents	inside	
documents	 themselves:	 beginning	 with	 the	 most	 recent,	 I	 traced	 back	 the	 history	 of	 references	 in	 the	
analysed	documents,	considering	the	frequency	or	emphasis	of	the	citations	as	an	indicator	of	relevance	–	a	
snowball-type	sampling	method.	For	example,	the	Sapir,	Strauss-Kahn,	Kok	and	Aho	reports	were	cited	as	
notably	 influential	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy	 by	 the	 account	 on	 the	 design	 of	 the	 7th	
Framework	Programme	drafted	by	the	Commission	research	policy	officers	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	pp.	76–77),	
and	references	appear	in	numerous	other	documents.	
Secondly,	 I	 favoured	 the	 documents	 showing	 a	 wider-ranging	 political	 gaze,	 rather	 than	 reports	










































































Framework	Programmes	and	ERC	establishing	acts	 are	 the	 legal	 acts,	 published	on	 the	European	
Official	Journal,	enacting	the	initiatives,	and	describing	their	rationales	and	contents.		
The	 Commission	 policy	 documents,	 usually	 identified	 with	 the	 labels	 COM	 or	 SEC,	 describe	 the	






form	 other	 than	 ordinary	 one,	 proved	 particularly	 significant	 for	 the	 exploration	 of	 research	 policy	
procedures	and	conceptual	frameworks	from	the	standpoint	of	the	Commission.	
																																								 																				













Finally,	 although	 not	 institutional	 documents	 stricto	 sensu,	 communication	 products	 provide	 a	
specific	interesting	perspective	on	the	Commission’s	research	policy	framing	(e.g.	the	introductory	video	on	
Horizon	2020	repeatedly	cited	 in	chapter	Frames	and	narratives	 in	EU	policy	discourses	on	science	 for	 its	
concise	inclusion	of	many	of	the	analysed	features	of	the	frames).		
The	group	of	documents	on	which	the	research	was	based	is	reported	in	the	tables	below,	and,	to	
my	 knowledge,	 these	 constitute	 the	most	 influential	 conceptual	milestones	 that	 concurred	 to	 shape	 the	
current	 European	 research	 policy	 physiognomy,	 or	 represent	 notable	 keys	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
different	perspectives.	
The Framework Programmes and the ERC establishing acts 
The	final	outcome	of	the	policy-making	process,	involving	Commission,	Council	and	Parliament19,	is	
a	 legal	 document	 (or	 a	 set	 of	 legal	 documents)	 published	 on	 the	Official	 Journal	 of	 the	 European	Union	
(OJEU)20	and	binding	for	each	Member	State.		
These	documents	are	very	interesting	for	this	research	project	since	they	are	active	instruments	by	
which	 the	Union	 exerts	 its	 influence	 on	 European	 science,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 are	 lengthy	 and	
detailed	descriptions	of	the	scientific	landscape	visions	belonging	to	the	European	Institutions,	and	of	their	





an	Annex)	 contains	 the	details	of	 the	Programmes	 structure,	 and	each	 research	 theme	 is	 explained	with	
regards	 to	 its	 aims,	 contents,	 and	 relevant	 issues;	 an	Annex	 concerning	 the	 total	 budget	 and	 the	 shares	













law-making	 bodies:	 the	 first	 three	 FPs	 were	 promulgated	 by	 the	 Council	 alone,	 while	 all	 the	 following	
required	also	the	involvement	of	the	European	Parliament;	the	type	of	legislation	transformed	as	well:	the	
































































while	 the	 Council	 is	 involved	 for	 what	 concerns	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 ERC	 inside	 the	 Framework	
Programmes.		
Table	5:	The	documents	relevant	to	the	establishment	of	the	ERC.	



























Exploratory analysis of the occurrences of key terms.	 As	 mentioned,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	
establishing	 acts	 are	 the	 result	 of	 both	 the	 stages	 of	 policy	 design,	 the	 first	 one	 centred	 around	 the	
Commission	proposal	preparation,	and	the	subsequent	formal	discussion	and	approval	phase,	realized	in	the	
EU	legislative	bodies:	Council	and	Parliament.	They	are,	in	other	words,	the	final	output	of	the	conceptual	
frames	 incorporation	 into	research	policies.	Furthermore,	 they	show	a	peculiar	structural	uniformity,	and	
















and	 Fig.	 32).	 The	 sectors	 and	 categories	 labelling	 the	 following	 documents	 owe	 their	 first	 input	 to	 this	
exploratory	analysis.	












Title	 Year	 Main	subject	 Commission	classification	code	
Growth,	competitiveness,	employment	-	The	challenges	
and	ways	forward	into	the	21st	century	-	White	Paper	 1993	 Growth	 COM(93)700	
An	Industrial	Competitiveness	Policy	for	the	European	
Union	 1994	 Growth	 COM(94)	319	final	
Green	Paper	on	Innovation	 1995	 Innovation	 COM(95)	688	final	
Towards	a	Europe	of	Knowledge		 1997	 Education	 COM(97)	563	final	
Agenda	2000	-	For	a	stronger	and	wider	union	 1997	 Growth	 COM(97)	2000	final	
The	First	action	plan	for	innovation	in	Europe	 1997	 Innovation	 	
Science,	society	and	the	citizen	in	Europe	-	Commission	
Working	Document	 2000	 Science	&	Society	 SEC(2000)	1973	
Towards	a	European	research	area		 2000	 ERA	 COM(2000)	6	final	
European	governance	-	A	White	Paper	 2001	 Political	integration	 COM(2001)	428	final	





The	role	of	the	universities	in	the	Europe	of	knowledge	 2003	 Education	 	
















European	Research	Council	 2007	 Basic	research	 OJ	L57	
A	single	market	for	the	21st	century	 2007	 Growth	 COM(2007)	724	final	
Inventing	our	future	together.	The	European	Research	
Area:	New	Perspectives	-	Green	Paper	 2007	 ERA	 COM(2007)	161	
Europe	2020	Flagship	Initiative	Innovation	Union	 2010	 Innovation	 COM(2010)	546	final	
Europe	2020	-	A	strategy	for	smart,	sustainable	and	






and	Innovation	 2011	 Research/Innovation	 COM(2011)	808	final	
The	Grand	Challenge.	The	design	and	societal	impact	of	
Horizon	2020	 2012	 Research/Innovation	 	
A	Reinforced	European	Research	Area	Partnership	for	
Excellence	and	Growth	 2012	 ERA	 COM(2012)	392	final	
European	Research	Area	-	Progress	Report	2014	 2014	 ERA	 COM(2014)	575	final	
Taking	stock	of	the	Europe	2020	strategy	for	smart,	
sustainable	and	inclusive	growth	 2014	 Innovation	 COM(2014)	130	final/2	





and	 the	 most	 appropriate	 procedures,	 and	 finally	 legitimising	 the	 chosen	 policy	 options.	 Although	 not	
published	 in	 the	same	form	of	 the	other	Commission	documents,	 they	provide	an	 interesting	account	on	
research	policy	from	the	standpoint	of	the	Commission.	To	my	knowledge,	such	accounts	have	been	drafted	
only	 for	 the	 mentioned	 Framework	 Programmes,	 the	 first	 in	 view	 of	 the	 set	 of	 policies	 on	 knowledge	





Table	 7:	 The	 Commission	 policy	 officers’	 books	 on	 the	 conceptual	 foundations,	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 5th	 and	 7th	
Framework	Programmes	
Authors	 Title	 Year	














Experts	 reports	 may	 be	 endorsed	 in	 subsequent	 political	 discourses	 and	 cited	 in	 following	
documents,	 exerting	a	notable	 influence	on	policy	developments,	 or	 conversely	be	archived	without	 any	































































Barre,	R.	et	al.	 ERA	Indicators	and	Monitoring	-	Expert	Group	Report	 2009	 ERA	
































The communication products 





















Innovation-Union	 2010	 video	 (EC,	2010d)	
Innovation	Union	(Act	2)		 2010	 video	 (EC,	2010e)	
Responsible	Research	and	Innovation	-	Europe’s	ability	to	respond	to	societal	
challenges	 2012	 leaflet	 (EC,	2012b)	
Discover	Innovation	Union	 2013	 video	 (EC,	2013a)	
Horizon	2020	-	EU	research	and	innovation	 2014	 video	 (EC,	2014d)	
Horizon	2020	-	General	overview	 2014	 video	 (EC,	2014e)	
Horizon	2020	in	brief.	The	EU	Framework	Programme	for	Research	&	
Innovation	 2014	 leaflet	 (EC,	2014f)	
Research	and	Innovation:	Pushing	boundaries	and	improving	the	quality	of	
life	 2014	 leaflet	 (EC,	2014g)	
Responsible	Research	and	Innovation:	aligning	R&I	with	European	society.		 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015d)	
30th	Anniversary	EU	Research	Framework	Programmes	1984-2014	|	Horizon	
Magazine	-	Special	issue	 2015	 magazine	 (EC,	2015a)	
Horizon	2020	video	-	How	to	apply?	 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015c)	
Horizon	2020,	the	new	generation	of	European	funding.	 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015b)	
The	European	Research	Area	(ERA)	 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015e)	
FP7	-	Funding	by	Member	State	-	Report	card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016d)	
FP7	-	What’s	next	-	Report	card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016e)	
Research	and	Innovation	Funding:	making	a	real	difference	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016h)	
Horizon	2020	-	Two	years	on	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016g)	
FP7	-	Boosting	Research	Capacity	-	Report	Card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016b)	
FP7	-	Dispelling	some	myths	-	Report	Card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016c)	



















European integration and the policy-making 








been	 influenced	 and	 shaped	 by	 a	 number	 of	 different	 factors;	 in	 the	 European	 case,	 in	 particular,	 the	
confrontation	 on	 the	 different	 models	 of	 integration	 never	 stopped	 and	 it	 is	 still	 clearly	 visible	 in	 the	
institutional	asset.	The	history	of	the	European	integration	had	also	a	profound	influence	on	the	development	
of	a	 communitarian	 scientific	policy,	and	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	understand	 the	current	 configuration	 if	not	
acknowledging	its	historical	impressions.	
Which science for which Europe? 
Notwithstanding	the	role	played	by	research	policy	in	the	process	of	European	integration,	science	
and	technology	weren’t	recognised	as	areas	of	communitarian	interventions23	in	the	1957	Treaty	establishing	




The	 evolution	 of	 the	 European	 policy	 on	 research	 was	 marked	 by	 diverse	 internal	 and	 external	
factors:	the	radical	developments	occurred	in	the	physiognomy	of	science	after	WWII,	the	laborious	process	






2000;	Sanz	Menéndez	&	Borrás,	2000):	 in	other	words,	 the	 role	of	 “policy	 frames”	needs	 to	be	 rightfully	
considered	as	well,	both	as	the	consequence	of	the	evolution	in	the	understanding	of	research	policy	and	as	
prescriptive	tools	of	following	developments,	defining	its	new	universe,	actors,	values	and	methods.	
Post-war reconstruction and the foundation of the European big laboratories.	The	national	urgencies	
of	 the	 immediate	post-war	period	mainly	 concerned	 the	 reconstruction	efforts,	 in	material,	 political	 and	
economic	terms;	however,	the	fields	related	to	science	and	technology	underwent	relevant	interventions	as	

































European	 countries26	 signed	 the	 agreement	 establishing	 CERN	 (Conseil	 Européen	 pour	 la	 Recherche	
Nucléaire)	in	Geneva,	on	the	French-Swiss	border27,	devoted	to	research	in	fundamental	physics.	Although	






scientists,	 funds	 and	 infrastructures.	 All	 the	 European	 laboratories	 were	 founded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
intergovernmental,	ad-hoc,	agreements	among	countries	interested	in	pooling	resources	in	the	disciplines	
judged	most	promising,	 also	 in	 response	 to	USA	and	USSR	progresses	 in	 the	 same	 fields:	 ESO	 (European	
Southern	Observatory)	was	built	in	1962	in	Chile	by	Belgium,	Germany,	France,	The	Netherlands	and	Sweden,	
while	 EMBL	 (European	 Molecular	 Biology	 Laboratory)	 was	 established	 in	 Heidelberg	 in	 1974	 by	 the	
collaboration	of	Austria,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	Israel,	Italy,	The	Netherlands,	Sweden,	Switzerland	and	
United	Kingdom.	Furthermore,	ESA	(European	Space	Agency)	was	founded	in	1975	from	the	merge	of	two	
earlier	 organisations28,	 and	 it	 shared	 with	 Airbus,	 established	 in	 1970,	 a	 prevailing	 orientation	 towards	
industrial	applications.	
Towards a European coordinated scientific policy.	All	these	developments	were	characterised	by	a	set	
of	common	features:	they	were	publicly	funded,	basic	science,	non-military,	big	installations29.	Public	debate	
evolved,	modelled	after	the	successful	example	of	CERN.		
During	the	 ‘60s	and	‘70s	the	understanding	of	science	policy	changed,	 in	Europe	as	well	as	 in	the	
whole	Western	area:	while	previously	the	main	rationale	for	funding	science	with	public	funds	was	essentially	
political	 (and	military	 in	 the	 immediate	post-war),	with	 the	aim	of	 gaining	prestige	and	 catching	up	with	




















reinforce	 the	 links	 among	 the	 scientific	 actors	 throughout	 Europe	 without	 questioning	 the	 national	
sovereignty	 and	 the	 equilibrium	 among	 countries	 (Barry,	 2001).	 COST	 (Coopération	 européenne	 dans	 le	
domaine	 de	 la	 recherche	 scientifique	 et	 technique)	 and	 ESF	 (European	 Science	 Foundation),	 created	
respectively	 in	1971	and	 in	1974	were	 the	 first	examples	of	multidisciplinary,	network-like	organisations,	
working	as	a	meeting	point	of	governmental	research	institutions,	industries	and	universities.	
Debates	on	the	«technological	gap»	led	to	a	shared	feeling	of	the	need	for	more	coordination	in	the	
European	 system	 of	 scientific	 research;	 the	 main	 unsolved	 issue	 among	 European	 politicians	 was	 the	
management	model	of	the	networks.	There	were	two	main	options:	the	intergovernmental	one,	based	on	
targeted	 agreements	 among	 interested	 countries,	 and	 the	 centralized	 one,	 aimed	 at	 profiting	 of	 the	
economies	 of	 scale	 at	 continental	 level.	 Clearly,	 the	 countries	 keen	 on	 nationalism	 preferred	 the	
intergovernmental	paradigm,	based	on	peers’	agreements,	in	order	to	preserve	their	complete	sovereignty.		









with	 research	 policies	 was	 reorganised:	 Research,	 Science	 and	 Education	 went	 to	 DG	 XIII,	 under	
Commissioner	 Ralf	 Dahrendorf,	 while	 Industry	 and	 technological	 affairs	 remained	 to	 DG	 III,	 under	 the	
responsibility	 of	 Commissioner	 Altiero	 Spinelli	 (Guzzetti,	 1995).	 These	 two	 Directorates,	 under	 different	
political	responsibilities,	were	going	to	be	central	for	the	development	of	EU	R&D	policy31.	
In	 1974	 the	 European	 Community	 for	 the	 first	 time	 legislated	 on	 scientific	 and	 technologic	
development,	with	the	rationale	that	«a	common	policy	 in	the	field	of	science	and	technology	 is	 likely	to	
																																								 																				




a	continuous	and	balanced	expansion,	an	 increased	stability,	an	accelerated	raising	of	 the	standard	of	 living	and	closer	 relations	
between	its	Member	States»	(Trattato	che	istituisce	la	Comunità	economica	europea,	1958).	





economic	 needs	 of	 the	Community,	 in	 order	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 «development	 of	 a	 common	policy	 on	
science	and	technology»,	but	it	paved	the	way	for	the	developments	of	the	following	decade.	
In	the	‘80s,	the	emphasis	on	technological	applications	and	industrial	development,	paired	with	the	
economic-political	 objective	 of	 competitiveness	 was	 on	 top	 of	 the	 research	 policy	 agenda:	 in	 1982	 the	
Commissioner	for	industry	and	S&T	Etienne	Davignon	launched	ESPRIT	(European	Strategic	Programme	for	
Research	and	Development	in	Information	Technology),	an	initiative	essentially	different	from	the	previous:	












initiatives,	 and	 the	 First	 Framework	 Programme	 (FP1),	 supra-nationally	 controlled	 and	 pre-competitive	

















In	1986,	at	 last,	with	 the	Single	European	Act,	 the	Treaties	were	amended	with	 the	addition	of	a	





encourage	 undertakings	 including	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 undertakings,	 research	 centres	 and	
universities	in	their	research	and	technological	development	activities.	
A	fundamental	point	to	solve	for	the	realization	of	the	First	Framework	Programmes,	in	consideration	
of	 the	 differences	 between	 nationalistic	 and	 pro-European	 perspectives,	 was	 the	 justification	 of	 the	
communitarian	intervention.	A	set	of	criteria,	named	after	the	German	minister	Reisenhuber,	was	elaborated	




—	 research,	 the	 joint	 execution	 of	 which	would	 offer	 obvious	 financial	 benefits,	 even	 after	 taking	
account	of	the	extra	costs	inherent	in	all	international	cooperation,			
—	research	which,	because	of	the	complementary	nature	of	work	being	done	nationally	in	part	of	a	




scientific	 and	 technical	 area	 and	 research	 leading,	where	 the	 need	 is	 felt,	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	
uniform	standards.	
This	 first	 set	 of	 criteria	 was	 the	 core	 of	 the	 principles	 shaping	 the	 relations	 among	 European	







but	 an	 embodiment	 of	 the	 political	 identity	 of	 European	Union,	 in	 abiding	 search	 of	 a	 balance	 between	
central	management	and	the	national	governments.		
The political unification and the transition to innovation.	 The	 Maastricht	 Treaty,	 signed	 in	 1992,	
marked	a	major	change	in	Europe:	the	political	unification	of	Europe	was	established,	four	decades	after	the	








the	 separate	 steps	 of	 basic	 research,	 applied	 research,	 development,	 (production	 and)	 diffusion	 (Godin,	






























The budget for research.	 Fig.	 3	 shows	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 share	 of	 European	budget	 devoted	 to	
research,	as	extracted	from	EU	Financial	Reports36	(CEC,	2009;	EC,	2012a,	2014,	2016a):	research	allocations	
experienced	continued	growth,	both	in	absolute	terms	and	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	EU	budget.	Yet	the	












36	 I.e.,	 the	 data	 appearing	 in	 the	 plot	 express	 the	 allocations	 traced	 and	 grouped	 under	 the	 label	 «research»	 by	 the	
Commission	itself	(see	in	particular	CEC,	2009).	








A not-yet-completed evolution.	 Table	 10	 summarises	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 timeline	 the	milestones	 of	
European	 research	 policy,	 since	 the	 Communities’	 foundations	 in	 the	 ‘50s,	 highlighting	 the	 reference	
paradigm	 shifts:	 from	 big	 laboratories	 to	 collaborations	 or	 coordinated	 programmes,	 from	 political	 to	
economic	objectives	and	from	basic	science	to	technological	development.		
Table	10:	Timeline	of	 the	European	 research	policy	milestones,	 grouped	by	 type	pf	 initiative:	EU	 institutional	events	 relevant	 to	
research	 policy,	 foundation	 of	 big	 laboratories,	 establishment	 of	 scientific	 collaboration	 or	 coordinated	 research	 initiatives.	 The	












































































































































1987	 	 	 Launch	of	FP2	
1990	 	 	 Launch	of	FP3	
1992	 Signature	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty	 	 	
1994	 	 	 Launch	of	FP4	
1995	 Green	Paper	on	Innovation	 	 	





1999	 Signature	of	Bologna	accords	 	 	



















2010	 Launch	of	Europe	2020	 	 	
2014	 	 	 Launch	of	Horizon	2020	
	
While	the	models	centring	on	the	“Pairing	of	basic	science	&	political	objectives”	and	on	the	“Pairing	




science	 (see	 the	 conceptual	 frameworks	 identified	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 Frames	 and	 narratives	 in	 EU	 policy	
discourses	 on	 science):	 the	 current	 period	 could	 hence	 represent	 a	 very	 propitious	 opportunity	 for	
confronting	on	the	different	visions	on	the	nature	and	positioning	of	knowledge	and	the	diverse	coexisting	
frames	on	the	role	of	research	in	Europe,	laying	the	groundwork	for	future	developments.	
The scientific policy-making process in the European Union 
Any	 analysis	 regarding	 the	 conceptual	 frameworks	 developed	 and	 inserted	 in	 scientific	 policy	
documents	 cannot	 disregard	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 same	 documents	 have	 been	 produced,	 and	 the	
institutional	actors	who	played	a	role	in	shaping	them.	Equally	relevant,	particularly	so	given	the	argument	
of	 this	 research,	 are	 the	 ideas	 about	 European	 integration,	 that	 sustained	 the	 Community	 creation	 and	
evolution	and	that	are	still	influential	to	the	EU	current	self-understanding	and	political	development38.	
Theories of EU integration and the European institutional structure 
European	Union	process	of	policy-making	is	particularly	convoluted,	mainly	because	it	bears	the	signs	
of	its	not-yet-completed	integration	history.	The	confrontation	among	Member	States	on	the	different	views	



























it	 needs	 for	 a	 plastic	 articulation	 and	 development	 of	 a	 political	 life	 according	 to	 the	 particular	
characteristics	of	the	various	people.		
The	European	states,	in	the	federalist	vision,	should	renounce	to	their	national	sovereignty	in	some	




on	 the	principles	 of	 liberal	 democracies,	 in	 particular	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 funding	on	 fundamental	 rights	 and	
representative	governments.	





authorities	would	have	 led	to	“functional	spill-overs”	 to	neighbouring	sectors,	causing	 further	 integration	
and	possibly	leading	to	the	creation	of	a	new	political	entity	(Schumann	declaration,	1950):	
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Europe	will	not	be	made	all	at	once,	or	according	 to	a	 single,	general	plan.	 It	will	be	built	 through	
concrete	achievements,	which	first	create	a	de	facto	solidarity.	






and	 intergovernmental	bargaining	at	EU	 level,	with	European	 institutions	viewed	as	providers	of	credible	
commitments	for	member	governments.	Alongside	this	theory,	a	new	interest	in	the	role	of	institutions	and	
EU	 rules	 to	 influence	 political	 outcomes	 was	 promoted	 by	 «new	 institutionalist»	 schools,	 distinguished	
according	 to	 their	 prevailing	 research	 approach:	 «rational-choice»,	 «historical»	 and	 «sociological	
institutionalisms».	While	the	first	two	shared	with	the	intergovernmentalists	a	prevailing	rationalist	approach	
–	where	collective	behaviour	 is	 seen	as	determined	by	 the	behaviour	of	 individuals,	each	of	 them	taking	






A complex physiognomy and the democratic deficit.	There	is	no	common	position	among	scholars	also	
on	the	essential	nature	of	the	European	Union,	whether	it	should	be	studied	as	an	international	organization	
or	a	nation-like	political	 system,	or	a	different	and	new	polity:	 a	 “governance	without	government”.	The	
literature	on	 the	«governance»	approach,	emphasizing	 the	EU’s	 capability	 to	mobilize	 large	and	complex	
institutional	and	informal	networks	of	actors,	has	promoted	an	assessment	of	the	issue	of	an	EU	«democratic	
deficit»,	referring	to	the	fact	that	the	European	Union’s	increasing	intervention	in	domestic	governance	is	
allegedly	 mining	 national	 autonomies,	 without	 empowering	 citizens’	 participation	 to	 decision-making	
through	the	construction	of	a	robust,	completely	democratically	legitimate,	institutional	structure.	This	crisis	
of	legitimation	has	been	obviously	sharpened	by	the	rise	of	Eurosceptic	movements	and	by	the	strict	fiscal	




















The	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 was	 created,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 to	 emphasize	 the	






of	 the	 European	 Union,	 another	 intergovernmental	 assembly	 is	 highly	 influential	 on	 European	 policies,	














Although	 the	 Council	 and	 Parliament	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 development	 and	 use	 of	
conceptual	frameworks	in	policy	strategies,	it	is	the	Commission	that	enacts	the	pivotal	actor	with	regards	to	
their	setting	and	elaboration.		
The	European	Commission,	 in	 fact,	 retains	 the	«right	of	 initiative»	 for	new	 legislative	proposals	–	
even	if	it	is	often	asked	to	develop	projects	along	the	political	lines	established	by	the	Council	–,	it	practically	




















Directorates	 (cf.	 Fig.	 29)	 –	 Research	 and	 Innovation	 (RTD),	 Communications	 Networks,	 Content	 and	
Technology	 (CNECT),	 Education	 and	 Culture	 (EAC),	 Energy	 (ENER),	 Internal	 Markets,	 Industry,	
Entrepreneurship	 and	 SMEs	 (GROWTH),	 Mobility	 and	 Transport	 (MOVE),	 Migration	 and	 Home	 Affairs	
(HOME),	Agriculture	and	Rural	Development	(AGRI).		


















We	 find	 in	 European	history	 and	practices	 several	 different	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 contrasting	policy	
methods.	 Scholars	 recognize	 at	 least	 five	 different	 models	 (Wallace,	 2005),	 spanning	 from	 those	 more	
suitable	to	politically	centralized	approaches	to	others	close	to	the	intergovernmental	understanding	of	the	
EU	structure.	













The regulatory model.	 By	 the	mid-‘80s,	while	 Europe	was	 shifting	 to	 the	 competition	 regime	and	
developing	 the	 single	 European	 market,	 an	 alternative	 policy	 model	 emerged,	 based	 mainly	 on	 an	
architecture	of	regulations	orchestrated	by	the	Commission.	In	comparison	with	the	preceding	model,	this	
«regulatory	mode»	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “negative	 integration”,	 for	 it	 is	 built	 upon	 a	 legal	
framework	 instead	 of	 active	 policy	 initiatives.	 In	 this	 configuration,	 the	 Council	 acts	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 the	
national	 governments	 to	 agree	 on	 the	 minimum	 standards	 for	 harmonization,	 and	 the	 stakeholders,	
especially	the	economic	ones,	have	extensive	opportunities	to	influence	the	(often	market-related)	rules.	The	
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surveillance	 role	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	 rules	 is	 assigned	 to	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 while	 the	
European	 Parliament	 is	 the	 place	 to	 discuss	 the	 non-economic	 factors	 (environmental,	 social,	 etc.),	 but	
retains	little	power	to	influence	the	implementation	of	the	regulations.	The	regulatory	policy-making	mode	
was	 applied	 first	 to	 the	development	of	 the	 single	market,	 and	 it	 is	 often	used	 for	 economic	 issues,	 like	
competition	or	industrial	policies.	It	is	sometimes	applied,	at	least	in	the	earliest	stages,	to	other	non-market	
related	 sectors,	 like	 the	 social	 affairs	 and	 the	 environment:	 for	 example,	 the	 European	 policies	 on	
biotechnologies	have	considerably	been	managed	through	a	regulatory	approach.	









The	 European	 Parliament	 in	 this	 schema	 acts	 as	 a	 controller,	 representing	 the	 preferences	 of	
territorial	politics.	While	 for	previous	models	governments	were	the	only	mediators	of	 the	 interplay	with	




The policy coordination model.	A	softer	way	to	implement	common	strategies	in	Europe	consists	in	
the	voluntary	coordination	of	policies,	on	the	model	of	what	has	been	happening	since	the	early	‘60s	in	the	
forum	 of	 the	 OECD.	 The	 Commission	 acts,	 in	 this	 frame,	 as	 the	 developer	 of	 a	 Network	 of	 experts	 and	
stakeholders,	while	 the	Council	 is	 the	 convenor	of	 high-level	 groups,	 focusing	more	on	 the	discussion	of	




macroeconomic	policies	of	 the	member	states	at	 the	time	when	the	single	currency	was	 introduced.	The	





Intergovernmental negotiations.	 Finally,	 regarding	 the	 most	 sensitive	 policy	 areas	 involving	 the	
countries’	sovereignty,	 like	foreign	policy	and	international	security,	decisions	are	normally	taken	through	
intensive	 intergovernmental	 negotiations	 among	 the	member	 states,	 and	 specifically	 involving	 a	 distinct	
circle	of	key	national	policy-makers.	Consequently,	 in	this	«intensive	transgovernmental»	mode,	the	most	




The EU decision-making process(es) for scientific research 
As	aforementioned,	the	field	of	scientific	policy	in	EU	is	not	managed	with	a	single	legislative	process,	
but	with	issue-specific	procedures.		
Open Method of Coordination and regulatory policy-making.	 A	 special	mode	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 the	









dimension	 of	 enhancing	 the	 investments	 in	 research,	 the	 group	 produced	 mainly	 economy-oriented	
recommendations	 on	 the	 harmonization	 and	 reform	 of	 national	 policy	 strategies,	 fiscal	 regimes,	 public-
private	links	and	intellectual	property41.		
The	 planning	 of	 investments	 in	 research,	 though,	 is	 regulated	 through	 the	 «Open	 Method	 of	
Coordination»,	 apparently	 intergovernmental	 in	 essence;	 other	 scientific	 domains,	 also	 for	 their	 intrinsic	
delicacy,	have	been	and	still	are	particularly	affected	by	regulatory	policy-making:	e.g.	biotechnology,	food	














Programmes.	 Most	 of	 the	 resources	 are	 distributed	 by	 structural	 funds	 –	 the	 European	 Structural	 and	
Investment	 Funds	 (ESIF),	 devoted	 to	 stimulate	 the	 least	 economically	 developed	 regions	 of	 the	 EU	 and	
focused	on	 research	 infrastructures,	 technology	 transfer,	 businesses	 and	 skills	 programmes	 –,	 by	 sector-
specific	research	programmes	–	like	Euratom,	ITER,	or	the	Copernicus	and	Galileo	satellite	programmes	–	and	
the	Framework	Programme,	which	plays	the	major	role,	in	terms	of	contributions44.	Moreover,	as	shown	also	
by	 the	 European	 research	 policy	 history,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 are	 the	 instruments	 presenting	 a	
clearer	conceptual	orientation:	they	are	not	sector-specific	but	multidisciplinary,	their	legitimation	involves	
rationales	linked	not	only	to	concrete	economic	or	technologic	targets,	but	also	to	the	construction	of	the	












































fields	 –	 excepted	 those	most	 delicate	 for	 the	 intergovernmental	 supporters:	 foreign	 and	 defence	 policy,	
institutional	reforms,	tax	policy,	a	share	of	social	policies	and	a	part	of	the	areas	in	the	field	of	justice	and	
home	affairs.	
According	 to	 this	procedure	 (cf.	Fig.	13),	 the	Commission	has	 the	«right	of	 initiative»	 to	start	 the	
process46,	and	develops	a	legislative	proposal	to	be	submitted	to	both	the	Council	and	the	Parliament.	The	





Council,	 at	 this	moment,	doesn’t	 accept	all	 the	amendments,	 a	Conciliation	Committee,	 composed	of	 an	
equal	number	of	members	of	the	Parliament	and	of	Council	representatives,	is	convened	in	order	to	reach	
an	 agreement	 on	 a	 joint	 text,	 that	 is	 subsequently	 sent	 to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 for	 approval,	
without	the	possibility	to	modify	it	further.	If	they	both	approve	it,	the	law	is	adopted;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	
rejected.	
Horizon	 2020’s	 formal	 legislative	 iter	 (coded	 2011/0401(COD),	 cf.	 Table	 12)	 was	 launched	 in	
November	 2011,	 when	 the	 Commission	 published	 the	 proposal	 for	 a	 regulation	 concerning	 the	 new	
Framework	Programme,	consisting	of	a	brief	introduction,	the	legal	text	itself,	and	complementing	it	with	a	




«Competitiveness»	 configuration	 –	 concerned	 of	 Internal	 Market,	 Industry,	 Research	 and	 Space,	 whose	
mandate	is	to	«enhance	competitiveness	and	increase	growth»	(CEU,	n.d.).	During	the	debate	process,	the	
text	has	undergone	a	series	of	adjustments:	the	review	was	coordinated	by	the	Parliamentary	Committee	on	
Industry,	 Research	 and	 Energy	 (ITRE),	 and	 realized	 both	 with	 internal	 confrontations	 and	 with	 the	
																																								 																				







incorporation	 of	 contributions	 from	 the	 other	 concerned	 Committees47.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 inputs,	 five	








30/11/2011	 Legislative	proposal	published	 COM(2011)	 809	 final,	 with	 the	
complementary	 working	 documents	
SEC(2011)1427	and	SEC(2011)1428	























section	 with	 the	 details	 of	 the	 disciplinary	 issues	 to	 tackle	 (see	 the	 devoted	 paragraph	 The	 Framework	
Programmes	and	the	ERC	establishing	acts),	constitutes	the	general	terms	of	reference	of	the	multiannual	
programme	for	research	funding.	After	the	publication	of	the	establishment	act,	the	Commission	is	due	to	






















The FPs design process. While	 the	approval	of	 the	Programme	 involves	 the	whole	EU	 institutional	
structure,	 the	 previous	 preparation	 and	 the	 following	 administration	 phases	 are	 responsibility	 of	 the	
Commission.		












Andrée	 distinguishes	 three	 phases:	 a	 first	 articulated	 one,	 concerning	 the	 “Political	 decisions”,	 a	
second	one	regarding	the	“Administration”	of	FPs	and	concerning	the	drafting	of	Work	Programmes	and	calls	
for	 applications,	 and	 a	 third	 one	 considering	 the	 “Implementation”	 through	 the	 actual	 mechanism	 of	
selection.	In	the	political	phase,	the	most	relevant	for	the	elaboration	of	conceptual	frameworks,	decisions	
are	taken	at	a	high	hierarchical	level	on	objectives,	criteria	and	priority-setting,	and	the	top-down	structure	
of	 the	Programme	 is	 defined;	 the	 scientific	 contents	 in	 this	moment	 are	defined	broadly,	while	 they	 are	
specified	down	to	the	level	of	topics	only	in	subsequent	phases.	Alongside	this	main	stream	of	Programme	
structuring,	eventual	strategic	decisions	may	influence	the	priority	setting,	or	other	instruments	or	funding	
schemes	may	be	defined	–	e.g.	 the	 Joint	Technology	 Initiatives,	or	 the	European	Research	Council	 (ERC),	
which	uses	a	different,	bottom-up,	selection	procedure.	
The	 political	 preparation	 stage,	 entailing	 principally	 the	 moments	 of	 agenda-setting	 and	 policy	

























the	 design	 of	 the	 Programmes.	 Since	 2003,	 in	 fact,	 every	 legislative	 proposal	 drafted	 by	 the	 European	
Commission	has,	by	 law,	to	be	complemented	with	a	detailed	impact	assessment,	explaining	in	detail	the	
rationales	of	the	proposal,	«involving	rigorous	analysis	of	all	the	evidence	and	a	careful	consideration	of	all	
policy	 options»	 (EC,	 2012c).	 Although	 clearly	 these	 documents	 were	 produced	 to	 account	 for	 the	





















concerns	 or	 contemporary	 crisis	 events	 (Young,	 2014).	 When	 the	 issues	 at	 stake	 are	 technical,	 the	
involvement	 of	 scientific	 expertise	 is	 particularly	 broad	 and	 relevant,	 and	 consequently	 epistemic	














and	 evaluation	moments.	 The	 expected	 outcome	 of	 policy	 networks’	work	 is	 the	minimization	 of	 policy	
alternatives	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 prevailing	 proposal,	 that	 is	 subsequently	 included	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 drafts	
proposals.	
The	Commission	is	even	more	concerned	with	organizing	a	comprehensive	and	cohesive	procedure	




present,	 from	a	viewpoint	 inside	 the	European	Commission,	 the	nuts	and	bolts	of	how	EU	research	











































and	 finally	«to	make	 it	easier	 to	 find	consensus	during	 the	 formal	 institutional	decision-making	process».	
Therefore,	according	to	the	authors,	consultations	serve	at	the	same	time	the	purposes	of	refining	policies,	
enhancing	 democratic	 participation,	 precociously	 building	 consensus	 and	 –	 not	 least	 –	 enhancing	 the	
Commission’s	position	with	respect	to	the	formal	legislative	bodies,	the	Parliament	and	the	Council,	by	means	
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of	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	 stakeholders’	 consultations	 as	 the	 Commission’s	 peculiar	 way	 of	 obtaining	
democratic	legitimacy		(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	144):	
Both	the	Council,	representing	Member	States,	and	the	European	Parliament,	representing	EU	citizens,	
possess	 democratic	 legitimacy.	 However,	 this	 formalised	 institutional	 interaction	 does	 not	 exclude	
direct	 contact	 between	 the	Commission	and	 its	 stakeholders.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 one	of	 the	Commission’s	
obligations	according	to	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	(…)	
The	 stakeholders,	 according	 to	 the	 policy	 officers,	 are	 not	 a	 pre-defined	 set	 of	 actors,	 but	 are	
identified	according	to	the	«problem	at	stake	and	the	purpose	of	the	policy	action»	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	
145);	these	are	«researchers	in	the	field,	policy	makers,	users	of	research	results,	or	interested	individuals»,	
coming	 from	a	 variety	of	 sectors	 including	«public	 administrations,	 research	 institutes,	universities,	 large	
companies,	SMEs,	international	organisations»	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	143);	«innovation	agencies,	industries,	
universities,	 NGOs,	 intermediary	 associations»,	 «Member	 States	 and	 associated	 countries,	 regional	
governments,	 national	 research	 councils	 and	 a	 number	 of	 European	 representative	 organisations»	 (EC,	













impact	 can	be	discerned	or	 no	 real	 representative	 sample	 of	 opinions	was	 gathered,	 dialogue	and	




















The	 commission	 people	 decide	 initially	 the	 content,	 the	 priorities.	 Of	 course,	 they	 do	 talk	 to	 the	




CERN	 was	 requested	 to	 give	 an	 input	 to	 both	 the	 Commission,	 in	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 H2020	







































Points	 (NCPs),	 the	 network	 of	 reference	 organisations	 chosen	 by	 governments	 to	 offer	 country-specific	
practical	 information	 and	 assistance	 on	 the	 participation	 to	 Horizon	 2020:	 each	 topic	 is	 committed	 to	 a	
devoted	NCP	expert,	and	these	can	be	gathered	in	a	single	organization	or	belonging	to	different	institutions	
–	 like	 in	 the	 French	 case,	 where	 the	 experts	 are	 distributed	 among	 several	 institutes.	 According	 to	 the	
scientist,	National	Contact	Points	are	crucial	to	promote	the	flow	of	information	between	the	country	and	
Brussels,	and	to	enhance	the	ability	of	researchers	to	«react	quickly»	in	response	to	funding	opportunities.	
The	 interviewee	 depicts	 what	 he	 calls	 «a	 real	 democratic	 schema»,	 where	 Commission	 officers	 play	 a	
technical	role,	sorting	the	information	and	opinions	shared	by	stakeholders	and	composing	the	Programme’s	
proposal	according	to	the	emergent	consents.		






















From	 her	 observatory	 at	 the	 Unit	 for	 the	 support	 of	 research	 and	 third	 mission	 (ARIC)	 at	 the	





different	 weights.	 During	 all	 these	 consultations,	 she	 recognized,	 the	 Universities’	 efforts	 are	 typically	
concentrated	 on	 pressuring	 to	 obtain	 an	 appropriate	 valorisation	 of	 their	 research	 issues:	 they	 watch	
primarily	over	 the	presence	of	 subjects	 that	 are	 relevant	 for	 their	 research	 groups,	 and	 they	discuss	 the	
adequacy	 of	 related	 budgets,	 while	 they	 are	 less	 concerned,	 at	 least	 at	 her	 University	 level,	 with	 the	
overarching	political	structure.	Her	supposition	was	that	the	Programme	configuration	was	decided	by	the	
Commission	on	the	basis	of	the	analysis	of	the	EU	situation	and	of	the	previous	Programmes	assessments;	
besides,	she	didn’t	recognize	 in	Horizon	2020	any	drastic	change,	but	a	general	 reorganization	of	 themes	
already	present	in	FP7.	
The	disciplinary	National	Contact	Points,	 in	 the	 Italian	case,	are	all	belonging	 to	a	 same	no-profit	
organization,	 the	Agency	 for	 the	 Promotion	 of	 European	Research	 (APRE),	 that	 since	 1989	 is	working	 to	
































The	 discussion	 on	 the	 budget	 for	 FP7	 happened	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	 negotiations	 for	 the	 overall	
Multiannual	Financial	Framework	of	the	Community	(MFF	2007-2013),	and	was	affected	by	the	conflictual	
political	 climate.	 The	 first	 budget	proposal	 elaborated	by	 the	Commission	dates	back	 to	2004,	when	 the	
Lisbon	 Strategy	 had	 just	 undergone	 the	 mid-term	 review,	 and	 was	 still	 very	 high	 in	 EU	 agenda:	 the	
Commission	proposed	an	increase	in	the	spending	for	research	of	a	factor	two,	and	the	figure	of	73	billion	
euros	was	 proposed	 for	 the	 Seventh	 Framework	 Programme	 in	 2005.	 The	 research	 community	 and	 the	
Parliament	welcomed	 the	 Commission’s	 proposal,	while	 the	 Council,	 representing	 the	 national	 interests,	
showed	a	mixed	 reception:	 the	political	 support	 for	 the	Community	had	 just	 suffered	a	 setback	with	 the	









with	 the	 part	 devoted	 to	 “Competitiveness	 for	 Growth	 and	 Employment”	 (of	which	more	 than	 half	was	
foreseen	for	R&D)	representing	the	12.2%	of	the	total.	The	reaction	was	polarized	into	two	blocks	of	member	
states,	identified	by	media	coverage	with	the	“Blair	vs.	Juncker”	expression	(see	for	example	Smith,	Watt,	&	
Temko,	 2005):	 the	 first,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 Sweden,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Spain	 and	 Finland,	 argued	 for	 a	
reduction	 of	 the	 budget	 share	 devoted	 to	 agriculture	 in	 favour	 of	more	 Lisbon-related	 topics,	 including	
research;	 the	 second	group	–	among	which	 relevant	 countries	were	France,	Poland,	Spain,	Germany	and	





succeeding	 Blair	 Presidency,	 despite	 the	 declarations	 against	 the	 large	 share	 of	 budget	 devoted	 to	





The	 Parliament	 and	 the	 research	 community	 showed	 their	 disappointment	 by	 means	 of	 official	




































the	 European	 Institute	 of	 Innovation	 and	 Technology	 (EIT),	 funded	 in	 2008	 –	 on	 the	model	 of	MIT	 in	 the	US	 –	 to	work	 on	 the	
integration	of	the	“Knowledge	Triangle”	dimensions:	higher	education,	business,	research	and	technology.	It	finances	“Knowledge	










to	 defend	 the	 share	 for	 ERC.	 The	 scientific	 community,	 that	 since	 the	 beginning	 had	 supported	 the	
Commission’s	request	and	the	Parliament’s	position,	expressed	concern	for	the	cuts	to	Horizon,	publishing	
an	 «ERA	 Stakeholders	 Joint	 Statement	 on	 the	 European	 Fund	 for	 Strategic	 Investments	 (EFSI)»	 (CESAER,	
EAERTO,	EUA,	LERU,	&	Science	Europe,	2015).	










approaches	 to	 decision-making,	 according	 to	 different	 scientific	 issues,	 and	 in	 the	 specific	 roles	 and	
behaviours	of	the	European	institutions	involved	in	law-making.		
Nonetheless,	 a	 prevailing	 method	 for	 scientific	 policy-making	 has	 emerged:	 the	 multiannual	
Framework	Programme	schema,	which	is	currently	by	far	the	prevailing	method	for	EU	to	exert	influence	in	
the	landscape	of	European	scientific	research.		
The	 Framework	 Programmes	 are	 not	 only	 technical	 procedures	 of	 funding	 distribution,	 but	
incorporate	as	well	theories	of	economic,	social	and	political	order	and,	finally,	visions	of	European	future.	
Throughout	 the	 law-making	 process,	 the	 most	 sensitive	 part	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 building	 of	 reference	
conceptual	frameworks	is	the	initial	conception	of	the	Framework	Programmes	in	the	Commission	offices,	
before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 formal	 iter	 of	 consultations	 and	 institutional	 debates,	 as	 it	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	



































the	 launch	 of	 the	 Programme,	 sums	 up	 the	 dense	 web	 of	 expectations	 and	 projections	 into	 the	 future	
embedded	into	the	Framework	Programme	for	research	funding.		
Dealing	with	research	programmes	doesn’t	only	mean	describing	the	procedures,	or	explaining	the	
available	 lines	 of	 funding:	 it	 entails	 expressing	 the	 visions	 that	 underpin	 research	 policy,	 its	 orientation,	
motivations,	actors,	 values,	 issues.	 In	other	words:	 it	 involves	conveying	and	 representing	 the	concerned	
conceptual	frames.		
Master	frames	and	narratives	always	imply	explanations	of	the	past	and	visions	of	the	future,	which	
they	 contribute	 to	 shape.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Framework	 Programmes	 –	 analysed	 here	 as	 the	 prevailing	
instruments	of	European	research	policy	of	the	last	three	decades	–	the	historical	roots	date	back	to	the	very	







polity,	 saw	 the	 rise	of	new	 important	actors	on	 its	political	 scene	 (citizens,	engaged	 scientists),	 launched	
major	strategies	in	the	knowledge	fields	(Lisbon	strategy,	ERA,	Bologna	process),	implemented	an	internal	
reform	 of	 the	 governance,	 opened	 to	 the	 largest	 enlargement	 in	 its	 history,	 failed	 the	 project	 for	 a	
Constitution	and	had	to	face	the	consequences	of	the	economic	crisis.	All	these	events	marked	a	stamp	in	
how	research	policies	have	been	conceived	and	implemented.	
Alongside	 contemporary	 events,	 long-term	 cultural	 reflections	 and	more	 recent	 developments	 in	
academic	thinking	about	the	role	and	orientation	of	research	funding	have	influenced	the	development	and	











Consequently,	 it	 is	 even	more	necessary	 to	unravel	 the	discourses	on	 research	policy	 in	order	 to	
identify	and	expose	the	relevant	conceptual	frames	and	what	their	features	imply	for	future	developments.	
The story told by the Framework Programmes establishing acts 
During	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 have	 been	 the	major	 instruments	 of	
European	research	policy.		
The	Framework	Programmes	establishing	documents62,	as	mentioned,	are	particularly	 relevant	 to	








perspective	 of	 the	 European	 institutions	 –	 the	 aims,	 foundations,	 concerns	 and	 projects	 to	 modify	 the	
scenario	in	the	interest	of	the	Member	States	and	of	the	European	citizens.		
In	other	words,	FPs	establishing	acts	are	situated	at	the	border	between	science	and	society,	where	
both	 co-produce	 each	other:	 they	 are	 thus	 especially	meaningful	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 socio-technical	 (and	
political)	conceptual	frameworks.	
Their	 first	 part	 in	 particular,	 explaining	 the	 Programmes’	 base	 principles	 and	 describing	 the	








































The first Framework Programmes.	 The	 first	 Framework	 Programme	 was	 conceived	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	‘80s	as	a	pilot	initiative	to	promote	a	reorganization	of	the	confused	and	scattered	landscape	
of	 the	European	research-promoting	 initiatives,	each	of	 them	requiring	a	specific	effort	of	 legitimation	 in	
front	of	the	Council,	a	body	that	is	traditionally	reluctant	to	accept	any	communitarian	initiative.	Up	to	the	
Single	 European	 Act,	 in	 1986,	 there	 was	 formally	 no	 legal	 mandate	 for	 research	 policy	 in	 the	 Treaties,	
therefore	it	was	necessary	to	legitimize	each	communitarian	intervention	in	that	field.	The	debates	on	the	






Whereas	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 Treaty	 establishing	 the	 European	 Economic	 Community	 assigns	 to	 the	
Community	 the	 task,	 among	 others,	 of	 promoting	 throughout	 the	 Community	 a	 harmonious	
development	of	economic	activities,	a	continuous	and	balanced	expansion	and	an	accelerated	raising	
of	the	standard	of	living;	
Whereas	 it	 is	 important	 to	 promote	 balanced	 scientific	 and	 technical	 development	 within	 the	
Community;	
	The	«scientific	and	technical	objectives»	of	the	Programme	focused	on	the	competitiveness	of	the	















same	 paragraph	 in	 the	 preamble,	 and	 complemented	 it	 with	 a	 series	 of	 new	 elements,	 expanding	 and	
enriching	the	motivations	for	action	(CEU,	1987):		
(…)	in	order	to	encourage	the	development	of	the	international	competitiveness	of	European	industry,	






policies	 of	 the	 Community,	 and	 its	 strategy	 for	 research	 and	 technological	 development,	 shall	
contribute	to	this	objective;	
Already	 in	 this	 early	 Framework	 Programme,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 recognize	 the	 polarization	 of	 the	
objectives	 around	 two	main	 orientations:	 on	 one	 side,	 the	 logic	 chain	 connecting	 the	 reinforcement	 of	
research	to	the	strengthening	of	 the	S&T	basis	 for	 the	 industry,	which	 in	 turn	was	 intended	to	boost	 the	
European	international	competitiveness;	on	the	other	side,	the	target	of	«cohesion»	was	inserted	–	i.e.,	in	
the	EU	lingo,	the	aim	of	reducing		the	social	and	economic	differences	among	the	European	regions	–	and	




more	 resources	 to	 be	 devoted	 to	 “market-pulled”69	 industrial	 research,	 to	 be	 coupled	 with	 the	 social	
objectives	 (Guzzetti,	 1995);	 cohesion	 was	 also	 added	 to	 the	 Riesenhuber	 criteria70	 as	 a	 justification	 for	
communitarian	involvement.	
The	Second	Framework	Programme	was	not	yet	completely	developed	when	the	new	Commissioner	












multiannual	 Programmes.	 This	 Programme,	 that	 faced	 fierce	 battles	 on	 the	 budget72,	 confirmed	 the	
increasing	importance	that	the	information	and	communication	technologies	were	beginning	to	represent	in	
the	 eyes	 of	 the	 European	 scientific	 politicians	 and	 officers:	 while	 in	 FP1	 the	 greatest	 budget	 share	 was	
devoted	to	energy	(47.2%),	followed	by	industrial	competitiveness	(28.2%),	FP2	assigned	42.2%	of	the	funds	















-	 introducing	 a	 European	 dimension	 into	 the	 training	 of	 scientific	 research	 and	 technological	
development	staff;	




political	 dimension	 was	 added	 to	 the	 previous	 economic	 physiognomy	 of	 the	 Community:	 a	 European	
citizenship	was	established,	a	 social	policy	was	 introduced	and	 the	communitarian	areas	of	 interventions	
were	expanded.	In	the	field	of	science,	«all	the	research	activities	deemed	necessary»	were	promoted	by	the	
Treaty,	 thus	 widening	 the	 fields	 of	 European	 intervention	 and	 opening	 for	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	
expansion.		















The turning point: ERA and Lisbon.	 As	 mentioned,	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 Millennium	 has	 to	 be	
considered	a	turning	point	for	Framework	Programmes,	and	FP5,	active	from	1998	to	2002,	is	the	transition	
Programme.		






and	reduce	 levels	of	unemployment	and	social	exclusion.	 It	must	achieve	this,	 furthermore,	without	
sacrificing	 its	social	model	and	 its	cohesion	against	a	background	of	growing	globalisation	which	 is	
prone	to	foster	a	rise	in	national	and	regional	self-interest	rather	than	solidarity	and	co-operation.	








The	developments	 in	 the	Union	policies	of	 the	 ‘90s,	with	the	establishment	of	 the	new	European	
policies	in	the	social,	educational	and	cultural	areas,	led	to	a	series	of	important	changes	on	the	positioning	
of	 research	 in	 the	 European	 political	 strategy	 and	 in	 the	 significant	 broadening	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	
Programmes.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 below,	 academic	 and	 political	 reflections	 on	 the	 role	 of	 knowledge	 and	
innovation	had	 increasingly	acquired	 relevance,	 leading	 to	 the	 reformulation	of	 the	European	policies	on	





The	 Lisbon	 strategy	 originally	 was	 conceived	 with	 the	 input	 of	 «coupling	 innovation	 with	 the	























An	attentive	eye	was	 kept	 throughout	 the	document	on	 the	 citizens,	 often	described	as	 the	end	
beneficiaries	of	 the	policies,	and	thereby	 legitimating	the	actions;	ethical	aspects	of	 research73	and	equal	
opportunities	 were	 also	 inserted	 among	 the	 prescriptions	 for	 research	 projects.	 A	 «key	 action»	 on	 the	
improvement	of	the	«human	research	potential	and	the	socioeconomic	knowledge	base»,	with	a	limited	but	

























(Science	 and	 society)	 The	 activities	 carried	 out	 under	 this	 heading	 are	 intended	 to	 encourage	 the	
development	of	harmonious	relations	between	science	and	society	and	the	opening-up	of	innovation	
in	Europe,	as	well	as	contributing	to	scientists'	critical	thinking	and	responsiveness	to	societal	concerns,	
as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 relations	 and	 an	 informed	 dialogue	 between	 researchers,	
industrialists,	political	decision-makers	and	citizens.	
























Commission	 changed	 political	 area,	 and	 the	 centre-left	 president	 Romano	 Prodi	 was	 succeeded	 by	 José	
Barroso	 from	 the	 centre-right	 European	 People’s	 Party,	 who	 would	 have	 remained	 in	 office	 for	 two	
mandates,	until	2014.			
The rise of innovation.	 FP7,	 developed	 from	 2004	 and	 2006	 (Andrée,	 2009),	 after	 the	 political	
turnover,	 and	 launched	 around	 the	mid-term	 review	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy	 (2005),	 went	 further	 in	 the	
strategical	 characterization	 of	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 as	 key	 instruments	 of	 the	 communitarian	
strategy:	 the	 establishing	 act	 preamble	 was	 re-written	 –	 it	 had	 remained	 very	 similar	 since	 the	 first	
Framework	Programmes	–	and	 the	ERA,	 the	 Lisbon	agenda	and	 the	 triangle	of	 knowledge	were	 inserted	
among	the	reference	strategies	for	the	Programme	(EP	&	CEU,	2006b):	
The	 Community	 has	 the	 objective,	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Treaty,	 of	 strengthening	 the	 scientific	 and	








and	better	 jobs	and	greater	 social	 cohesion.	The	 triangle	of	 knowledge	—	education,	 research	and	
innovation	—	is	essential	for	achieving	this	goal,	to	which	effect	the	Community	aims	to	mobilise	and	
strengthen	the	necessary	research	and	innovation	capacities.	
The	 traditional	 rationale	 –	 research	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 industrial	 competitiveness	 –	 was	
complemented	with	the	Lisbon	and	ERA	objectives;	however,	while	in	FP5	the	two	poles	–	the	problems	of	
society	 and	 the	 industrial	 competitiveness	–	had	been	presented	 side	by	 side,	 in	 FP7	a	 causal	 relation	 is	
established	between	the	second	and	the	 first:	 strengthening	 the	S&T	basis	 for	 industry,	 thus	boosting	 its	










of	 innovation,	which	 has	 become	 the	 key	 concept	 of	 the	 current	 Framework	 Programme,	Horizon	 2020,	















- to	 improve	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 impact	 of	 framework	 programme	 research	 activities	 by	
ensuring	 better	 dissemination	 and	 exploitation	 of	 their	 results,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 transfer	 and	
dissemination	of	technology	from	various	sources,	taking	account	of	the	needs	of	customers	and	
users,	
- to	 facilitate	 access	 of	 programme	 participants	 (particularly	 SMEs),	 through	 provision	 of	
information	and	advice,	to	instruments	which	support	innovation.	





























for	 «Europe’s	 social	 market	 economy	 for	 the	 21st	 century»	 (EC,	 2010a)	 –	 influenced	 the	 conceptual	
framework	of	research:		
The	Union	 is	 committed	 to	 achieving	 the	 Europe	 2020	 strategy	which	 set	 the	 objectives	 of	 smart,	
sustainable	and	 inclusive	growth,	highlighting	 the	 role	of	 research	and	 innovation	as	key	drivers	of	
social	and	economic	prosperity	and	of	environmental	sustainability	(…)	
On	one	hand,	in	fact,	the	social	dimension	of	research	policies	is	re-affirmed	stronger	than	in	FP7,	




the	 Europe	 2020	 strategy	 by	 supporting	 activities	 covering	 the	 entire	 spectrum	 from	 research	 to	
																																								 																				
78	 «Decision	 No	 1513/2002/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 27	 June	 2002	 concerning	 the	 sixth	







the	 supported	activity	 is,	 the	 larger	 the	additional	 funding	 from	other	 sources	 should	be.	Activities	
closer	to	the	market	include	innovative	financial	instruments,	and	they	aim	to	satisfy	the	needs	of	a	
broad	 spectrum	 of	 Union	 policies	 by	 placing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 widest	 possible	 use	 of	 knowledge	
generated	by	the	supported	activities	up	to	the	commercial	exploitation	of	that	knowledge.	
Three decades of evolution.	The	contents	and	rhetoric	of	the	Framework	Programmes	establishing	




of	 the	 overall	 conceptualization	 of	 European	 science	 policies	 and	 involve	 notable	 changes	 in	 the	
understanding	of	the	issues	at	stake	and	of	the	instruments	of	research.	
If	 the	 first	 Programmes,	 developed	 before	Maastricht	 and	 in	 the	 frame	 of	 the	 common	market	
strategy,	were	mainly	aimed	at	strengthening	the	S&T	basis	for	the	European	industry,	in	order	to	boost	its	
competitiveness,	 from	 the	 1992	 signature	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on,	with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 new	 areas	 among	 the	












second	group	of	 terms	was	more	present	–	suggesting	an	anti-correlation	of	 the	 two	perspectives.	 If	 the	
																																								 																				
80	 The	 Framework	 Programmes	 establishing	 acts	 have	 been	 analysed	 with	 the	 web-based	 text	 reading	 and	 analysis	
environment	 Voyant	 (Sinclair,	 Stéfan	 and	 Geoffrey	 Rockwell,	 2016.	 Voyant	 Tools.	 Web.	 http://voyant-tools.org/),	 and	 further	
elaborated	by	the	author.	More	details	in	section	The	Framework	Programmes	and	the	ERC	establishing	acts.	
The	 terms	 considered	 are:	 for	 the	 “market”	 family:	 market*,	 business*,	 commerc*,	 econom*,	 financ*,	 competitiv*,	





conceptual	 frameworks	 focusing	 on	 industrial	 competitiveness	 and	 on	 economic	 growth	 are	 clearly	
contiguous,	 in	 the	 European	 research	 policy	 the	 first	 represented	 more	 clearly	 the	 key	 orientation	 of	
Programmes	in	the	pre-Maastricht	period,	while	from	the	Lisbon	strategy	onwards	the	anchor	concept	was	









that	 the	 “pure-science”	 perspective	 is	 still	 not	 completely	 integrated	 in	 the	 Programmes	 conceptual	
foundation,	 that	 was	 oriented	 for	 most	 of	 its	 history	 towards	 applied	 research	 and	 technological	
development	and	still	pursues	prevailingly	that	objective.	
From Knowledge society to Innovation Union: a paradigm-shift 
As	mentioned,	a	fundamental	nexus	point	in	the	EU	contemporary	research	policy	was	the	focus	on	
knowledge-based	development	 in	 the	early	2000	and	 the	 following	shift	 towards	 the	current	 innovation-
based	framework.	These	two	conceptualizations	have	been	so	important	to	filter	in	the	common	reference	
ideas	and	 language	of	 the	people	 involved	with	European	research	 (or	education)	also	at	 the	 lower	 local	
levels,	configuring	them	as	real	policy	paradigms,	able	to	shape	the	world-view	of	the	people	concerned	with	
them.		
The origins of the conceptual frameworks.	The	two	theories	diffused	in	the	political	arena	in	the	
same	years,	the	beginning	of	the	‘90s;	they	are	somehow	connected,	sharing	a	re-thinking	of	the	interplay	of	
knowledge,	 society	 and	economic	 life,	 but	 show	 important	differences,	 able	 to	 influence	 relevantly	 their	
outputs,	especially	when	adopted	to	frame	public	decisions.		
The	economists’	reconsideration	of	the	idea	of	innovation	came,	at	the	end	of	the	‘80s,	to	a	systemic	
conceptualization:	 systems	 of	 innovation	 involved	 knowledge-producing	 institutions	 like	 universities	 and	
laboratories	in	crucial	positions,	together	with	governments	and	industries,	and	the	wealth	of	the	systems	
was	 ascribed	 to	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 actors’	 interplay,	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 individual	 performances	
(Metcalfe,	1995;	OECD,	1997b):	










of	 science	 policies	 (triple	 helix,	 third	mission	 of	 the	 Universities)	 were	 developed	 according	 to	 this	 new	
perspective81.	
If	 the	main	 idea	of	both	approaches	was	 the	need	not	 to	consider	knowledge	 in	 the	void,	but	 to	
position	knowledge	production	robustly	in	the	societal	context,	the	developments	were	different.	On	one	

















the	 ongoing	 debate	 about	 the	 contribution	 of	 science	 and	 technology	 to	 growth,	 identifying	 in	 new	
technologies	 and	 S&T	 development	 the	 possible	 solutions	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 European	 competitiveness,	 and	
setting	the	base	for	subsequent	policies.	The	White	Paper	was	developed	on	an	initiative	of	the	Commission	
President	Delors,	at	his	third	mandate,	in	the	scenario	of	a	rising	disappointment	by	the	member	states	for	
the	 growing	 unemployment82,	 despite	 the	 political	 success	 of	 Maastricht	 and	 the	 future	 enlargement	








The	 wealth	 of	 nations	 is	 increasingly	 based	 on	 the	 creation	 and	 exploitation	 of	 knowledge.	 (…) 
The	key	elements	in	competitiveness	that	are	now	of	greatest	importance	are	no	longer	confined	to	
the	relative	level	of	the	direct	costs	of	the	various	factors	of	production.	They	include	in	particular	the	
quality	 of	 education	 and	 training,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 industrial	 organization,	 the	 capacity	 to	 make	
continuous	improvements	in	production	processes,	the	intensity	of	R&D	and	its	industrial	exploitation,	
the	 fluidity	 of	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 markets	 operate	 the	 availability	 of	 competitive	 service	










education	 and	 training	 systems.	 Education	 and	 training	 are	 expected	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 of	 the	









as	 a	 factor	 of	 social	 integration,	 equality	 of	 opportunity)	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 economy	
(competitiveness	and	job	creation).	(…)	





towns.	 Awareness	 of	 these	 insufficiencies	 has	 led	 our	 countries	 to	 develop	 collective	 solidarity	
mechanisms.	
The	 1995	Green	 Paper	 on	 Innovation	 (CEC,	 1995),	 basing	 on	 the	 1993	White	 Paper,	 emphasized	
especially	the	link	between	competitiveness,	employment	and	innovation:	
(…the)	 firms’	 capacity	 for	 innovation,	 and	 support	 for	 it	 from	 the	 authorities,	 were	 essential	 for	
maintaining	and	strengthening	this	competitiveness	and	employment.	This	Green	Paper	makes	use	of,	








When	dealing	with	a	definition	of	 the	term,	 the	document	distinguishes	between	 innovation	as	a	
process	or	as	a	product,	and	highlights	the	adoption	of	the	wider	meaning	of	the	concept:	
The	term	"innovation”	is	somewhat	ambiguous:	in	common	parlance	it	denotes	both	a	process	and	its	







genuine	 innovation	 culture»,	 «setting	 up	 a	 legal,	 regulatory	 and	 financial	 framework	 conducive	 to	
innovation»	and	«gearing	research	more	closely	to	innovation»:	
In	knowledge-based	economies,	the	efficient	systems	are	those	which	combine	the	ability	to	produce	
knowledge,	 the	 mechanisms	 for	 disseminating	 it	 as	 widely	 as	 possible	 and	 the	 aptitude	 of	 the	
individuals,	 companies	 and	 organizations	 concerned	 to	 absorb	 and	 use	 it.	 The	 crucial	 factor	 for	








mechanism	 is	 ultimately	 conceived	 linearly	 in	 a	 three-steps	 schema	 of	 production,	 dissemination	 and	
absorption.	
The	 reference	 institution	 for	 the	 definition	 of	 innovation	 in	 the	Green	 Paper	was	 the	OECD:	 the	
concepts	 of	 “National	 Systems	 of	 Innovation”	 and	 of	 “knowledge-based	 economy”,	 as	 shown	 by	 Godin	





















In	order	 to	derive	 the	maximum	benefit	 from	this	process	 in	 terms	of	growth,	 competitiveness	and	






The	 two	 key	 sectors	 for	 knowledge	 production	 and	 circulation	 –	 education	 and	 research	 –	were	
separately	 object	 of	 European-scale	 projects:	 in	 1999,	 the	Bologna	 accords	 asked	 for	 a	 rethinking	of	 the	
national	 higher	 education	 systems,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 ensuring	 their	 compatibility,	 and	 in	 early	 2000	 the	
97	
Commission	launched	the	“European	Research	Area”	(ERA),	an	initiative	intended	to	reduce	fragmentation	
of	 European	 R&D,	 boosting	 the	 free	 circulation	 of	 researchers	 and	 promoting	 more	 effective	 funding	
distribution	and	infrastructures	use.		
The	Lisbon	strategy,	launched	at	the	European	Council	in	March	2000,	merged	these	initiatives	in	the	





















“Europe	 of	 Knowledge”	was	 portrayed	 as	 a	 process	 linked	 to	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 dimensions	 (CEC,	
1997c;	Chou	&	Gornitzka,	2014):		
Economic	 competitiveness,	 employment	 and	 the	 personal	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 citizens	 of	 Europe	 is	 no	



















the	 economy:	 it	must	 be	 a	 Europe	 of	 knowledge	 as	well.	We	must	 strengthen	 and	 build	 upon	 the	
intellectual,	cultural,	social	and	technical	dimensions	of	our	continent.	
On	 the	 research	 side	 of	 the	 European	 knowledge	 policies,	 the	 Fifth	 Framework	 Programme	was	
designed,	 as	we	 have	 seen	 above,	 against	 the	 background	 of	 reflections	 on	 the	 new	 role	 of	 research	 in	
society,	centred	on	pursuing	«the	marriage	of	society	and	innovation»	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998,	p.	21).		




especially	 with	 regards	 with	 the	 soaring	 cost	 of	 research	 –	 and	 the	 fast	 obsolescence	 of	 products	 and	








describing	 the	 OECD	 approach	 to	 the	 «knowledge-based	 economy»	 and	 the	 various	 dimensions	 of	
knowledge,	 the	 study	 preferably	 refers	 to	 the	 «learning	 economy»,	 as	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	
valorisation	of	knowledge	in	the	economic	process:	


















driving	 forces	 of	 economic	 growth,	 competitiveness	 and	 employment.	 They	 are	 the	 best	 way	 of	
modernising	European	companies,	which	Europe	must	do	to	improve	its	competitive	position.	In	overall	
terms,	both	directly	and	indirectly,	they	help	to	maintain	and	develop	employment.		
From knowledge to innovation.	The	dynamic	 interplay	between	knowledge-	and	 innovation-based	





the	“Internet	bubble”,	 collapsed	 (almost	 in	 the	 same	months	of	 the	 strategy	 launch),	 the	policy	analyses	
acquired	less	optimistic	tones	and	were	characterised	by	an	increasing	feeling	of	urgency.	
The	Sapir	report	(Sapir	et	al.,	2003)	represented	a	first	evaluation	of	the	Lisbon	Strategy,	also	in	view	


































reducing	 the	 incentive	 to	work	 and	 to	 invest,	 hence	 further	 reducing	 the	 prospects	 for	 output	 and	
employment	growth.		
To	break	 the	«negative	 spiral»,	 in	 the	groups’	opinion,	Europe	had	 to	 focus	on	 innovation	as	 the	
«driver	of	economic	growth».	However,	the	authors’	representation	of	the	strategy,	contrary	to	mainstream	
policy	documents	on	 innovation,	 is	not	messianic:	 the	 innovation	process,	 they	argue,	can	show	negative	
consequences	if	it	is	not	properly	managed	with	appropriate	governance	adaptations:		
Innovation	and	change	will	continue	to	open	the	prospect	of	higher	productivity,	higher	wages	and	
improved	 living	 standards.	But	 they	will	 also	 continue	 to	be	disruptive,	displacing	workers,	making	
some	skills	obsolete	and	possibly	creating	more	pressure	towards	income	inequality.	
In	 the	 same	 year,	 a	 communication	was	 issued	 from	 the	 Commission,	 sanctioning	 the	 transition	
towards	an	innovation-centred	approach	from	the	very	beginning,	in	the	title	–	Innovation	policy:	updating	
the	Union’s	approach	in	the	context	of	the	Lisbon	strategy	(CEC,	2003a):	
With	 three	 years	already	passed	of	 the	 ten	 set	 by	 the	 Lisbon	 timetable,	 the	Union	must	 review	 its	
attitudes	and	approaches	to	innovation.	
101	




Since	 it	 is	 through	enterprises	 that	 the	economic	benefit	of	 the	successful	exploitation	of	novelty	 is	










strategy	 mid-term	 review,	 presented	 no	 particular	 novelties	 in	 the	 argumentation,	 focusing	 on	 the	
















88	 As	 for	 the	definition,	 the	document	 explicitly	 repeals	 the	 1995	Green	Paper	 on	 Innovation:	 «A	 concise	 definition	of	
innovation	is	“the	successful	production,	assimilation	and	exploitation	of	novelty	in	the	economic	and	social	spheres”».	
89	 «The	 Task	 Force	was	 composed	 of	 the	 following	members:	Mr	Wim	 Kok	 (Chairman),	 former	 Prime	Minister	 of	 the	
Netherlands;	Mr	Romain	Bausch,	President	and	CEO,	SES	Global	(Luxembourg);	Mr	Niall	FitzGerald,	Chairman	of	Reuters,	Chairman	
of	 the	 Trans-Atlantic	 Business	 Dialogue;	 Mr	 Antonio	 Gutiérrez	 Vegara,	 Member	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Parliament;	 Mr	 Will	 Hutton	





of	 the	 stage,	 largely	 building	 on	 Kok	 report	 recommendations.	 One	 of	 the	 pillar	 actions	 planned	 was	
denominated	«Knowledge	and	innovation	for	growth»,	pairing	in	a	compact	expression	the	two	concepts	we	






The	 Aho	 report90	 –	 Creating	 an	 Innovative	 Europe	 (Aho,	 Cornu,	 Georghiou,	 &	 Subirà,	 2006)	 –	
represented	 the	vertex	of	 the	climax,	presenting	an	analysis	 that	appeared	strongly	concentrated	on	 the	
promotion	of	innovation	and	notably	imbued	with	urgency:	
This	report	presents	a	strategy	to	create	an	Innovative	Europe.	Achieving	this	requires	a	combination	









Between	 2005	 and	 2006,	 approximately	 after	 this	 report,	 the	 transition	 to	 the	 innovation	 frame	
appears	to	be	completed:	new	documents	showed	to	take	for	granted	innovation	as	the	centre	of	gravity	of	
growth	 strategies,	 and	 devoted	 to	 the	 stabilization	 of	 this	 paradigm	 and	 to	 its	 enrichment	 with	 new	
articulations.	
																																								 																				

















of	 a	 single	 phenomenon;	 they	 represent	 the	 «new	 frontiers»	 of	 the	 «knowledge-based,	 service-oriented	
economy»:	
The	single	market	originally	conceived	for	an	economy	reliant	on	primary	products	and	manufactured	
goods	 has	 to	 adapt	 to	 foster	 openness	 and	 integration	 in	 a	 knowledge-based,	 service-oriented	
economy.	(…)	












(…)	 innovation	has	been	placed	at	 the	heart	 of	 the	 Europe	2020	 strategy.	 (…)	 Perhaps	 the	biggest	
challenge	for	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	is	to	adopt	a	much	more	strategic	approach	to	innovation.	
An	approach	whereby	 innovation	 is	 the	overarching	policy	 objective,	where	we	 take	a	medium-	 to	
longer-term	 perspective,	 where	 all	 policy	 instruments,	 measures	 and	 funding	 are	 designed	 to	






How	will	we	 tackle	 growing	 societal	 challenges	 like	 climate	 change,	 energy	 supply,	 the	 scarcity	 of	













Two interrelated but different frameworks.	The	two	frames	–	knowledge	society	and	innovation	




profit,	 and	 consequently	 economic	 growth,	 from	 the	 development	 of	 knowledge-intensive	 scientific	 and	
technological	 sectors:	 ICTs,	 biotechnologies,	 neurosciences,	 genetic	 engineering	 etc.	 (the	 humanities,	
although	 undeniably	 knowledge-intensive,	 are	 not	 usually	 implied	 in	 the	 discourse,	 unless	 they	 serve	
achieving	the	competitiveness	target).	 In	common	political	 language,	and	 in	particular	 in	European	public	
discourses,	the	expression	“knowledge	society”	is	then	frequently	used	as	a	synonym	for	“knowledge(-based)	
economy”,	 and	 carries	 with	 it	 the	 collection	 of	 ideas,	 norms,	 actors	 and	 values	 implied	 by	 the	 second	
expression.		
Nonetheless,	the	two	concepts	are	different,	and	in	fact	when	dealing	with	social	and	cultural	issues	
it	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 find	 in	 the	 discourses	 the	 expression	 “knowledge	 society”,	 rather	 than	 its	 economic	
formulation:	when	the	project	of	building	a	knowledge	society	is	examined	in	the	perspective	of	the	European	
identity	 and	 citizenship	 it	 appears	 straightforward	 to	 build	 on	 the	wider,	 and	 consequently	more	 open,	
conceptualization	 (see	 for	example	 the	aforementioned	CEC,	1997b,	2003b;	predominanly	pertaining	 the	
policies	on	education);	in	the	mentioned	Sorbonne	Joint	Declaration,	the	Europe	«of	the	Euro,	of	the	banks	
and	 the	economy»	 is	even	marked	 in	opposition	with	 the	«Europe	of	 knowledge»,	built	on	«intellectual,	
cultural,	social	and	technical	dimensions»	(Sorbonne	Joint	Declaration,	1998).		
The	concept	of	“knowledge”	indeed	retains	a	broad,	multidimensional,	meaning,	and	reflections	on	
the	“knowledge	society”	were	not	only	carried	out	 in	 the	economic	community,	but	were	matter	 for	 the	
social	studies.	The	expression	was	introduced	in	the	‘60s	and	then	diffused	by	the	scholars	Daniel	Bell	and	








well	 as	 in	 old	 tools,	 inherited	 from	 the	 past;	 it	 is	 the	 cultural	 base	 for	 people’s	 education,	 personal	
development	and	participation	to	the	polis;	it	is	finally	also	a	rising	form	of	capital	in	the	economic	system	
and	 an	 instrument	 of	 competence-building	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 unemployment	 (Cerroni,	 2006,	 2013).		
Knowledge,	in	the	expression	“knowledge	society”,	can	be	understood	as	a	common	good,	as	an	instrument	
for	the	individual	development	and	fulfilment,	as	a	tool	to	inform	citizenship,	or	as	an	economic	capital.	
“Knowledge-based	 economy”	 may	 be	 thought	 as	 a	 bridge-concept,	 narrowing	 the	 field	 of	
“knowledge	society”	 to	 its	economic	dimension	and	hence	bringing	 it	closer	 to	 the	notion	of	“innovation	
union”.	The	expressions	“knowledge-based	economy”	and	“innovation	systems”,	in	fact,	both	rely	specifically	
on	a	prolific	creation	of	 ideas	as	 the	basis	 for	 the	generation	of	new	capital,	able	 to	boost	 the	economic	
growth.	The	distinction	between	the	two	approaches	indeed	reflects	the	two	different	scholarly	perspectives	
present	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 systemic	 dimension	 of	 the	 process,	 the	 first	 more	 focused	 on	 the	
conceptualization	 of	 knowledge	 and	 on	 the	 learning	 activity,	 and	 the	 second	 more	 attentive	 to	 the	
institutional	actors	and	to	the	national	performances	(Godin,	2009).	
The	 idea	 of	 “innovation”,	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 public	 discourses	 on	 socio-economic	 development,	
properly	belongs	to	the	economic	field:	 it	 is	defined	 in	the	most	recent	edition	of	the	OECD	Oslo	Manual	
(OECD,	 2005)	 as	 «the	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 or	 significantly	 improved	 product	 (good	 or	 service),	 or	
process,	 a	 new	 marketing	 method,	 or	 a	 new	 organisational	 method	 in	 business	 practices,	 workplace	
organisation	 or	 external	 relations».	 In	 European	 documents	 it	 is	 defined	 as	 «the	 successful	 production,	
assimilation	and	exploitation	of	novelty	 in	 the	economic	and	 social	 spheres»	 (CEC,	2003a)	and	one	of	 its	
crucial	feature	is	the	capability	to	open	up	new	markets,	sustaining	growth	(CEC,	1995):		
In	brief,	 innovation	 is	 the	 renewal	and	enlargement	of	 the	 range	of	products	and	 services	and	 the	




R&D	 and	 education	 to	 their	 exploitability	 in	 the	 market	 economy,	 finally	 minimizing	 the	 non-economic	
dimensions	of	 the	 concept	 and	 consequently	excluding	 the	 related	 interpretive	 realms	 from	 the	debates	
underlying	political	choices.	
The	 economic	 connotation	 is	 indeed	 the	 most	 glaring	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 models.	
Conceptual	frameworks	are	primarily	defined	by	their	content:	“knowledge	society”	refers	to	a	social	system	







































































major	 concerns	 shared	by	 citizens	 in	Europe	and	elsewhere.	A	 challenge-based	approach	will	 bring	
together	resources	and	knowledge	across	different	fields,	technologies	and	disciplines,	including	social	
sciences	and	the	humanities.	This	will	cover	activities	from	research	to	market	with	a	new	focus	on	








competitiveness	 and	 innovation,	 and	 of	 societal	 relevance	 of	 research	 (Ulnicane,	 2015).	 This	 three-polar	
setting	 defines	 not	 only	 the	 research	 policies	 founding	 values	 and	 orientations,	 but	 also	 the	 different	
prominence	ascribed	to	societal	actors,	in	particular	scientists,	entrepreneurs	and	citizens.	The	three-pillars	
structure	was	actually	envisaged	according	to	«who	sets	the	agenda:	the	scientific	community	for	excellent	





More	 specifically,	 not	 only	 the	 three	 approaches	 show	 friction	 points	with	 each	 other,	 but	 also,	
internally	 to	 each	 pillar,	 different	 interpretations	 struggle	 to	 prevail,	 and	 the	 confrontation	 is	 frequently	
conducted	on	the	ground	of	re-framing	arguments	and	issues.	




or	 «instrumental»	 public	 good,	 namely	 it	 is	 meant	 to	 serve	 other	 objectives	 or	 produce	 other	 goods,	















of	 the	 powers	 which	 it	 holds	 in	 reserve,	 it	 can	 ultimately	 dominate	 the	 other	 forces.	 But	 science	
																																								 																				




the	 directions	 of	 social	 advance,	 and,	 in	 the	 process,	 destroying	 its	 very	 essence,	 the	 spirit	 of	 free	
inquiry.	To	make	science	conscious	of	itself	and	its	powers	it	must	be	seen	in	the	light	of	the	problems	



















and	orientation	of	 science,	 they	cannot	 refrain	 from	establishing	comparisons	between	science	and	 their	
preferred	political	organization.	Polanyi	 in	particular	 refers	 to	Adam	Smiths’	«invisible	hand»	guiding	 the	
market	as	the	model	for	science:	


















Research	 and	 Development	 (OSRD),	 the	 office	 coordinating	 wartime	 R&D	 efforts	 (including	 the	 early	
development	of	the	Manhattan	Project);	it	focused	on	the	need	to	publicly	support	scientific	research	if	the	







President	and	 to	 the	Congress,	but	had	 to	work	autonomously,	 and	 the	government	had	 to	 refrain	 from	
controlling	it,	excepted	for	the	setting	of	the	broad	substantial	orientation	of	research	lines.	
The	 report	 was	 received	 with	 mixed	 feelings,	 both	 by	 whom	 was	 suspicious	 with	 the	 public	
intervention	in	science	and	by	those	who	conversely	asked	for	more	control.	When	the	report	was	published,	
President	Roosevelt	was	dead,	 and	 the	new	one,	 Truman,	didn’t	 accept	 the	 idea	of	 the	 total	 absence	of	
democratic	control	over	the	agency:	he	stopped	the	“National	Science	Foundation	Act”	and	assigned	to	a	
new	 committee,	 headed	 by	 the	 sociologist	 and	 economist	 John	 R.	 Steelman,	 the	 task	 of	 rethinking	 the	
proposal.	The	new	report,	A	Program	for	the	Nation	(Steelman,	1947),	agreed	with	the	previous	one	on	the	
point	that	science	had	to	figure	among	the	strategic	resources	of	the	United	States,	but	didn’t	agree	with	the	





scientific	 community	 and	 imply	 a	 different	 status	 for	 knowledge:	 in	 the	 “Bush	 model”	 the	 positive	































the	 scenario	 a	 conflicting	 view	 of	 research	 policy,	 nearer	 to	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	 Bush	 model:	 an	
autonomous	institution,	funding	bottom-up	proposals	of	research	with	the	sole	criterion	of	excellence	and	
by	means	of	peer	evaluation.		
Distinct, yet mutually reinforcing?	The	European	research	policy	landscape	is	nowadays	much	more	
faceted	 than	 it	 was	 two	 decades	 ago,	 when	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 were	 prepared	 essentially	 in	
Brussels,	 without	 the	 burden	 of	 negotiations	 of	 the	 post-ERA	 period	 (Andrée,	 2009),	 and	 without	 the	
increased	importance	ascribed	to	research	in	strategic	terms.	Different	visions	of	the	role	of	science	coexist,	
and	concern	not	only	the	objectives	of	research,	but	also	the	very	rationale	of	public	support	to	knowledge	
production	 in	the	European	system.	The	context	 is	 thus	rich	of	potential	 tensions,	that	can	 lead	either	to	
conflicts	or	to	constructive	confrontations	and	to	the	establishment	of	new	equilibria.		
Notwithstanding	 the	 Commission’s	 effort	 to	 stress	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 Horizon	 2020	 three	
priorities	–	described	as	distinct,	yet	mutually	reinforcing	(EC,	2011a)	–,	these	inevitably	show	multiple	points	
of	 friction:	why	 should	a	 “pure	 scientist”,	 educated	 to	 the	 freedom	and	autonomy	of	 scientific	 research,	
																																								 																				
95	In	reference	to	the	aforementioned	Gallino’s	distinction.	
96	 In	 the	 European	 context,	 this	 principle	 states	 that	 the	 Member	 States	 receive	 from	 the	 UE	 in	 proportion	 of	 their	
contribution	to	the	budget.	
97	For	this	reason,	in	the	following	I	will	name	“economic	Steelman”	model	the	research	funding	in	the	innovation	frame,	









Although,	 as	 shown,	 the	 EU	 vision	 is	 by	 large	 dominated	 by	 the	 innovation	 framework,	 other	
perspectives	are	gaining	relevance,	causing	an	internal	labor	in	the	European	system.		
The dominant narrative: the Innovation frame, or “knowledge for growth” 
As	 mentioned,	 the	 European	 Community	 possesses	 a	 long-standing	 tradition	 of	 anchoring	
investments	in	scientific	research	to	their	contribution	to	economic	growth.		
A	specific	European	reason,	linked	to	its	same	foundational	identity,	is	that	the	Community	itself	was	








However,	 the	 European	 case	 is	 not	 singular:	 it	 is	 part	 of	 a	 general	 trend	 observable	 in	Western	












to	national	 growth,	began	differentiating	during	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	XX	 century,	 and	a	 relevant	 share	
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started	 assigning	 an	 important	 role	 to	 technical	 progress.	While	 neo-classical	models	 of	 growth	 treated	
technology	as	an	exogenous	variable,	new	theories	–	endogenous	growth	theory,	evolutionary	economics,	
neo-schumpeterian	economics	–	emphasized	the	role	of	knowledge	production,	technological	change	and	
innovation	 as	 central	 to	 economic	 growth,	 and	 contributed	 to	 a	 great	 degree	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	
literature	on	science	policies	and	innovation	studies	(Martin,	2012).	Moreover,	some	of	the	proponents	of	
these	 new	 theories	 spent	 part	 of	 their	 careers	 at	 influential	 international	 organisations,	 contributing	 to	
position	 research	 policies	 high	 in	 national	 political	 agendas	 –	 e.g.	 Christopher	 Freeman’s	work	 at	 OECD,	
starting	in	the	‘60s	(see	below),	but	also	the	numerous	contributions	of	scholars	belonging	to	his	and	related	






The	 new	 theories	 of	 growth	 (known	 as	 "endogenous")	 stress	 that	 development	 of	 know-how	 and	
technological	 change	 -	 rather	 than	 the	mere	accumulation	of	 capital	 -	are	 the	driving	 force	behind	
lasting	growth.	












If,	 in	 the	 ‘80s	 and	 early	 ‘90s,	 this	 translated	 in	 the	 science	 policy	 documents	 into	 providing	 the	













economic	 and	 social	 change.	 The	 advantage	 of	 the	 paring	 of	 society	 and	 innovation	 is	 that	 public	
policies	can	be	revitalised	without	earlier	objectives	being	abandoned.	Industrial	competitiveness	will	
no	 longer	be	an	objective	but	a	means	of	 increasing	 the	 contribution	of	 science	and	 technology	 to	
growth,	employment	and	the	 rapid	dissemination	of	 innovations.	Likewise,	 investing	 in	science	and	
technology	becomes	a	means	of	increasing	the	innovative	capability	of	the	economy.	
The	shift	from	industry-led	to	innovation-oriented	research	policy	reflects	a	corresponding	change	of	
focus	 in	 the	 STI	 academia:	 in	 the	 words	 of	 two	 main	 innovation	 scholars,	 C.	 Freeman	 and	 L.	 Soete,	


























The Innovation Union from the Commission’s perspective: the innovation frame and its sub-narratives. 
The	features	of	the	innovation	frame	are	particularly	visible	in	the	communication	products	realized	by	the	
Commission	at	the	launch	of	Horizon2020,	in	2014,	conceived	as	concise	descriptions	of	the	contents	of	the	
research	 Programmes,	 embodying	 the	 effort	 to	 promote	 the	 values	 of	 the	 programme	 and	 to	 prove	 its	
relevance	to	a	wider	audience	than	the	policy-makers’	community;	this	kind	of	media,	moreover,	are	notably	
interesting	 for	 what	 concerns	 the	 identification	 of	 conceptual	 frameworks,	 for	 their	 positioning	 at	 the	
sensible	border	between	science,	policy	and	society	(Jasanoff	&	Kim,	2015).	
The	introductory	video	to	Horizon2020,	What	is	Horizon	2020?	(EC,	2014e),	was	the	communication	




of	 sub-argumentations	 or	 sub-narratives	 accompanying	 and	 justifying	 the	 policy	 orientation;	 the	










is	portrayed	as	a	«trick»:	not	a	 long,	difficult	 learning	effort	or	a	consuming	 intellectual	endeavour,	but	a	











Europe	should	be	«turned»	 into	a	different	kind	of	Union,	 its	very	political	 identity	being	questioned	and	
reinterpreted	 here.	 The	 new	 identity,	 the	 “Innovation	 Union”,	 was	 defined	 as	 the	 strategy	 aimed	 at	
reinforcing	 the	 conversion	 of	 ideas	 into	market	 products,	 in	 order	 to	 «boost	 the	 economy».	 The	 images	
accompanying	 this	 statement	 were	 particularly	 telling:	 the	 sentence	 on	 the	 improvement	 of	 lives	 was	
pronounced	against	the	scene	of	a	family	at	the	supermarket,	happily	engaged	in	buying	the	products	that	















The	 feeling	of	urgency	 is	 a	pervasive	 feature	of	 the	Commission’s	discourses	 about	 research	and	
innovation,	since	at	least	the	turn	of	the	Millennium,	mainly	justified	by	the	fears	of	losing	ground	to	US	and	
to	 the	 Asian	 countries	 in	 the	 economic	 race.	 Often,	 in	 the	 documents	 proposing	 and	 describing	 growth	
strategies,	the	arguments	are	justified	on	the	basis	of	crisis	scenarios,	and	Europe2020	makes	no	exception,	
as	is	visible	in	the	words	of	the	document	proposing	it	in	2010	(EC,	2010a):		
Europe	 faces	 a	moment	 of	 transformation.	 The	 crisis	 has	wiped	 out	 years	 of	 economic	 and	 social	
progress	 and	 exposed	 structural	 weaknesses	 in	 Europe's	 economy.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 world	 is	
moving	fast	and	long-term	challenges	–	globalisation,	pressure	on	resources,	ageing	–	intensify.	The	
EU	must	now	take	charge	of	its	future.	
The	discourse	 is	clearly	not	only	describing	the	de	facto	 situation	of	 financial	crisis	 (honestly	very	
recent	at	the	time	of	writing),	but	it	is	relying	on	a	urgency	narrative	–	“there	is	no	more	time,	it	is	necessary	










lives,	 apparently	 in	 opposition	 with	 some	 less	 funding-worth	 scientific	 wanderings.	 This	 anti-intellectual	
approach	can	be	highlighted	 in	discourses	 in	 connection	with	 the	 rising	 importance	of	measurability	 and	




invoked	 in	 the	political	discourses,	 the	economisation	of	quality	of	 life	are	relevant	sub-discourses	of	 the	
Innovation	frame,	contributing	to	a	general	foreclosure	of	the	alternative	political	paths.	







“imperative”,	 “late”	 abound,	 as	 well	 as	 expressions	 like	 “time	 is	 running	 out”,	 and	 verbs	 linked	 to	
determination	of	action,	as	“must”,	“need”,	“want”	etc.	
In	2000,	the	European	Research	area	was	proposed	against	the	backdrop	of	a	«worrying	situation»:	













globalisation,	 all	 of	 which	 increase	 the	 demand	 for	 social	 protection.	 Failure	 to	 deliver	 on	 the	
commitments	of	the	Lisbon	Agenda	would	endanger	the	present	European	contract	and	could	lead	to	
its	fundamental	revision,	thereby	threatening	the	very	process	of	European	integration.	Fortunately,	
























intensively	 turned	 into	 innovations,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 new	 products,	 processes,	 services	 and	 business	
models,	which	generate	value	for	economy	and	society.	
The	 warnings	 in	 all	 these	 discourses	 relate	 to	 the	 social	 aspects	 of	 the	 citizens’	 experiences:	











The	 last	 two	years	have	 left	millions	unemployed.	 It	has	brought	a	burden	of	debt	that	will	 last	 for	
many	years.	It	has	brought	new	pressures	on	our	social	cohesion.	It	has	also	exposed	some	fundamental	
















































and,	 overall,	 our	 future	 standard	 of	 living	 depends	 on	 our	 ability	 to	 drive	 innovation	 in	 products,	
services,	business	and	social	processes	and	models.	This	is	why	innovation	has	been	placed	at	the	heart	
of	the	Europe	2020	strategy.	Innovation	is	also	our	best	means	of	successfully	tackling	major	societal	








procedures.	 The	 European	 Commission	will	 do	 what	 is	 necessary	 to	make	 the	 Innovation	 Union	 a	
reality.	
In	 the	 urgency	 narrative,	 the	 «weaknesses»	 of	 the	 European	 system	 are	 not	 only	 described,	 but	
emphasized	to	varying	degrees	in	order	to	form	the	legitimation	of	the	proposed	actions.		
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Even	 if	 rhetorically	 effective,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 argumentative	 structure	 to	 achieve	
persuasion,	nor	it	was	the	rule	in	European	discourses	before	the	turn	of	the	Millennium:	for	example,	the	
1993	White	Paper	on	Growth,	Competitiveness,	Employment	 (CEC,	1993b)	described	 the	problems	of	 the	



















and	by	another	 important	policy	document,	as	characterised	by	 the	«best	macro-economic	outlook	 for	a	
generation»	(Council,	2000).	











































«Real things!»: measurability and impact  
We	 have	 already	 mentioned	 above	 how,	 in	 the	 video	 realized	 by	 the	 Commission	 to	 introduce	
Horizon2020,	pressing	societal	challenges	were	presented	as	«real	things»,	and	later	on,	when	dealing	with	










Commission	 to	 position	 against	 time-	 (and	 money-)	 wasting	 research	 activities,	 whose	 results	 are	 not	
immediately	visible	as	tangible	improvements.	
This	 unspoken	 judgement	 is	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 conceptual	 framework	 assigning	 a	 positive	 value	 to	
practical,	tangible	spill-overs	while	at	the	same	time	unfavourably	judging	research	activities	with	opposite	
features.	The	consequences	of	such	an	evaluation	are	diverse:	a	focus	on	results	rather	than	on	the	process,	
a	 devaluation	 of	 intangible	 achievements,	 the	 rise	 of	 an	 «accountability»-based	model,	 an	 emphasis	 on	
measurability,	efficiency,	performance,	impact.	




Measuring research.	 The	works	 of	 Godin	 (Godin,	 2006c,	 2009)	 trace	 the	 evolution	 of	 accounting	
exercises,	making	use	of	statistical	standards	to	measure	the	performances	of	the	national	R&D	systems,	and	





















Sector	 -	 Frascati	 Manual	 Supplement	 (1989),	 Proposed	 Standard	 Practice	 for	 the	 Collection	 and	 Interpretation	 of	 Data	 on	 the	
Technological	 Balance	 of	 Payments	 (first	 edition	 in	 1990),	 Proposed	 Guidelines	 for	 Collecting	 and	 Interpreting	 Technological	
Innovation	Data	(Oslo	manual,	first	edition	in	1992),	Data	on	Patents	and	Their	Utilization	as	Science	and	Technology	Indicators	(first	




harmonized,	 innovation-output	 indicators	within	 the	 framework	of	 the	Oslo	Manual	was	a	 central	 factor	
behind	both	a	better	understanding	of	the	science	and	technology	system	and	the	changing	nature	of	the	
innovation	process	itself»	(Freeman	&	Soete,	2009).	




























&	 Kinnock,	 2000)	 –	 included	 various	 features	 aligning	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 NPM	 approach,	 in	 the	
management	of	human	resources	 (Knill	&	Balint,	2008),	but	also	 in	the	criteria	related	to	agenda-setting:	





The general neoliberal political-economic climate.	There	is	no	one-way	path	from	political-economic	
frameworks	to	real	processes	(or	vice	versa),	and	any	idea	diffuses	in	complex	ways,	influencing	and	being	
influenced	by	actual	realizations.	However,	it	is	possible	to	recognize	in	the	new	economic	theories,	in	the	
diffusion	of	statistical	 indicators	and	 in	the	rise	of	New	Public	Management	the	 influence	of	the	political-
economic	neoliberal	theory,	with	its	valorisation	of	markets	mechanism	and	private	actors	at	the	expense	of	
public	 interventions.	All	 these	components	composed	the	mainstream	political-economic	discourses	 that,	
although	seldom	patently	cited	in	documents,	contributed	to	the	definition	of	the	current	European	policies	
on	science.	
Neoliberal	 theories	 emerged	as	 a	 response	 to	 the	economic	 crises	of	 the	 ‘70s	 ad	 ‘80s,	 and	were	
characterised	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 «human	 well-being	 can	 best	 be	 advanced	 by	 liberating	 individual	
entrepreneurial	 freedoms	 and	 skills	 within	 an	 institutional	 framework	 characterized	 by	 strong	 private	
property	rights,	free	markets,	and	free	trade.	The	role	of	the	state	is	to	create	and	preserve	an	institutional	
framework	 appropriate	 to	 such	 practices»	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 Important	 tenets	 of	 neoliberalism	 are	 the	




political	 choice	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 one	 or	 the	 other	 model	 –	 given	 also	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 its	 system	 of	
representative	democracy	–	it	is	possible	to	recognize	in	the	European	policies	on	research	a	shift	towards	
some	features	of	the	described	political-economic	visions.		
The	 original	 concern	 of	 the	 ‘70s	 first	 attempts	 of	 European	 science	 policies	 was	 the	 lack	 of	
coordination	 of	 national	 programmes,	 and	 the	 ERA	 project	 was	 especially	 designed	 to	 overcome	 the	
«compartmentalisation	of	public	research	systems»	(CEC,	2000):	
It	 cannot	be	said	 that	 there	 is	 today	a	European	policy	on	 research.	National	 research	policies	and	
Union	policy	overlap	without	 forming	a	 coherent	whole.	 If	more	progress	 is	 to	be	made	a	broader	
approach	 is	needed	than	the	one	adopted	to	date.	 (…)	Essentially,	 the	non-existence	of	a	European	
research	 area	 is	 due	 to	 the	 compartmentalisation	 of	 public	 research	 systems	 and	 to	 the	 lack	 of	
coordination	in	the	manner	in	which	national	and	European	research	policies	are	implemented.	Much	
needs	to	be	done	in	this	area,	without,	however,	putting	unwieldy	mechanisms	in	place.	At	the	same	




the	 effectiveness,	 performance	 and	 impact	 of	 research,	 conceived	 as	 the	 «next	 step»	 for	 science	 policy	
(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998,	preface	by	Commissioner	Cresson):	
By	 focusing	 on	 increasingly	 specific	 objectives	 and	 subjects,	 this	Union	 policy104	 has	 created	 a	 real	






evidence	of	 the	 impact	of	 research	policies»,	 in	order	 to	maximise	 the	output/input	 ratio	 (Muldur	et	al.,	
2006):	











































based	 programmes.	 The	 formulation	 of	 policy	 objectives	 in	 terms	 of	 «challenges»,	where	 the	 issues	 are	






The	 researchers	 themselves,	 indeed,	 are	 asked	 to	 cultivate	 entrepreneurial	 skills:	 already	 FP5,	 in	
1998,	introduced	the	hybrid	term	«enterprising	researcher»,	able	to	produce	innovation	(EP	&	CEU,	1998):	
(encourage)	the	emergence	of	a	new	generation	of	enterprising	researchers	with	innovative	ideas;	
FP7	 (2006)	 advocated	 for	 the	 researchers	 to	 receive	 training	 in	 a	 broader	 spectrum	 of	 skills,	
«including	those	relating	to	technology	transfer	and	entrepreneurship»	(EP	&	CEU,	2006):	
Initial	training	of	researchers	to	improve	their	career	perspectives,	in	both	public	and	private	sectors,	
inter	 alia	 through	 the	 broadening	 of	 their	 scientific	 and	 generic	 skills,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	
technology	transfer	and	entrepreneurship,	and	attracting	more	young	people	to	scientific	careers.	
128	
Horizon	 2020,	 coherently	with	 its	 insistence	 on	 the	 need	 of	marketing	 ideas	 as	 fast	 as	 possible,	






impact	 of	 EU	 Research	 &	 Innovation	 Programmes»	 (Lamy	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 emphasises	 the	 entrepreneurial	
«reform»	that	should	be	promoted	in	European	education,	based	on	the	promotion	of	«self-confidence»	and	
tolerance	towards	«failures»:	
A	 fundamental	 reform	 of	 the	 role	 of	 education	 should	 systematically	 embed	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurship	in	education	across	Europe,	starting	from	early	stage	school	curricula.	Schools	should	
foster	a	culture	that	boosts	self-confidence;	society	should	build	an	environment	that	allows	for	failure	





and	 results,	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 of	 researchers,	 position	 EU	 innovation	 frame	 in	 the	
general	Western	shift	towards	the	valorisation	of	practical,	tangible	research	outputs	and	characterisation,	
favoured	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 neoliberal	 thinking,	 the	 OECD-promoted	 emphasis	 on	 S&T	 measurement	 and	
benchmarking,	 and	 the	 New	 Public	Management	 approach	 to	 public	 administration.	 The	 same	 political-
economic	climate	influenced	the	portrayal	of	quality	of	life	as	strictly	connected	to	wealth	production.	
Innovation is the answer: a linear path from wealth to happiness 
















shift	 towards	a	 low	carbon	economy,	 increase	the	use	of	renewable	energy	sources,	modernise	our	
transport	sector	and	promote	energy	efficiency.	









Each	 priority,	 even	 those	 belonging	 to	 the	 social	 care	 and	 education	 sectors,	 are	 ultimately	
legitimized	by	economic	factors:	education	systems	need	to	increase	their	«performance»	in	order	to	speed	












and,	 overall,	 our	 future	 standard	 of	 living	 depends	 on	 our	 ability	 to	 drive	 innovation	 in	 products,	
services,	business	and	social	processes	and	models.	This	is	why	innovation	has	been	placed	at	the	heart	
of	the	Europe	2020	strategy.	Innovation	is	also	our	best	means	of	successfully	tackling	major	societal	





















with	 public	 services	 and	 by	 creating	 the	 wealth	 necessary	 to	 finance	 the	 equality,	 health,	 social	
cohesion	and	common	security	that	our	citizens	desire.	Investments	in	education,	science,	research	and	
innovation	should	not	be	seen	as	alternatives	to	investments	in	the	welfare	society	in	Europe,	but	as	
necessary	 though	not	sufficient	means	to	ensure	 its	sustainability,	albeit	 through	a	reformed	social	
model	conducive	to	innovation.	
The	 report,	 focused	 on	 «creating	 an	 innovative	 Europe»,	 promoted	 the	 «use	 of	 the	 force	 of	 the	





legitimising	reason	for	action.	However,	 the	same	citizens,	elsewhere	 in	 the	same	work,	are	described	as	
alarmingly	reluctant	to	change,	and	are	suggested	to	adapt	to	the	proposed	innovation-oriented	actions	if	

























research	and	 innovation	and	maximising	 its	 impact	 is	 probably	 the	best	option	 that	Europe	has	 to	
deliver	solutions	and	future	well-being	for	its	citizens.	
The Innovation frame as a political instrument 
The	 European	 choice	 to	 base	 R&D	 funding	 to	 innovation,	 although	 historically	 and	 conceptually	
motivated	by	a	tendency	shared	by	most	of	the	Western	countries,	presents	distinct	features	that	mark	the	
use	of	the	innovation	frame	as	a	political	instrument.	






and	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 wealth	 and	 power.	 It	 weds	 with	 the	 enhancement	 of	 entrepreneurship	 in	 the	






novelties	 per	 se,	 despite	 their	meaning	 or	 orientation,	 likewise	 progress	 backed	 the	most	 recent	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 the	 old.	 Both	 narratives,	 moreover,	 rely	 on	 simplifications	 and	 linearization	 of	 complex	
phenomena,	working	as	a	tool	to	realize	value-based	judgements	on	new	phenomena	or	developments.	
From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 innovation	 frame	 has	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 political	 tool,	 with	 distinct	
features	and	orientation.	



































The	 economic	 frame	 didn’t	 receive,	 however,	 the	 full	 consensus	 of	 the	 European	 citizens,	 who	
expressed	their	concerns	 in	 the	public	debate	and	through	protest	events.	The	apprehension	regarding	a	







Science’s	 role	 in	society,	however,	 is	a	complex	and	multifaceted	subject,	 involving	value-related,	
political,	 social	 and	 ethical	 reflections;	 the	 history	 of	 the	 disputes	 around	 this	 topic	 is	 recent	 but	 lively,	







Another	 device	 of	 inclusion	of	 citizens’	 concerns	 to	 science	policies	 design	 is	 represented	by	 the	
ongoing	lively	debate	on	«Responsible	Research	and	Innovation»	(RRI),	which	was	integrated	in	Horizon	2020	
as	 the	most	updated	stage	of	 the	 reflections	on	«Science	and	Society»,	emerged	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	
Millennium	and	developed	in	EU	research	policies	through	the	successive	steps	of	«Science	in	Society»	and	
«Science	 with	 and	 for	 Society»	 (the	 current	 denomination);	 the	 concept	 of	 RRI,	 as	 inserted	 in	 H2020,	
however,	incorporates	also	other	lines	of	thought,	mainly	centred	on	the	ethical	evaluation	of	research	and	
on	social	equality	in	the	field	of	science.			


























































fully	 understand	 the	 complex	 scientific	 issues	 at	 stake,	 in	 case	 of,	 for	 example,	 the	 control	 of	 weight,	








science	 in	general,	but	 failed	to	 find	the	same	good	disposition	when	narrowing	the	spectrum	to	specific	















top-down	 vision,	 re-examining	 the	 publics	 and	 its	 abilities	 and	 engaging	 the	 citizens	 in	 communication	
activities.	The	Royal	 Society	 itself	 in	2002	published	a	new	Report,	 acknowledging	 the	 inadequacy	of	 the	
“Public	Understanding	of	Science”	approach	to	the	new	scientific	and	social	context.	






better	 status.	 First,	 the	 research	 topics	were	 increasingly	 designed	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 needs	 of	 the	
«users»:	the	public	was	no	more	considered	completely	passive,	with	the	only	task	to	fit	as	final	consumer	
into	 the	production	process,	but	began	participating	 in	 that	process;	nonetheless,	 citizens	were	 still	 only	
considered	as	part	of	a	procedure.	
The	terms	related	to	«citizenship»	began	to	appear	significantly	only	in	the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Framework	
Programmes	 (1998-2006,	 see	Fig.	32),	but	 then	experienced	a	drop	 in	 the	Seventh,	where	 the	document	
referred	overall	more	often	 to	«users»	and	«consumers»	 than	 to	«citizens».	Horizon	2020	 increased	 the	
reference	 to	«citizens»,	 although	without	 reaching	 the	 FP6	 frequency,	while	diminished	 the	mentions	of	
«users».	
The	 development	 in	 linguistic	 references	 reflected	 the	 changes	 in	 research	 themes:	 particularly	
meaningful	 to	 understand	 the	 relations	 science-society	 is	 the	 aforementioned	 appearance	 of	 lines	 of	

































civil	 society's	 concerns	 and	 expectations	 and	 by	 facilitating	 their	 participation	 in	 Horizon	 2020	
activities.	The	engagement	of	citizens	and	civil	society	should	be	coupled	with	public	outreach	activities	
to	generate	and	sustain	public	support	for	Horizon	2020.	
«Fostering a genuine culture of innovation».	 While	 before	 Maastricht,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	
Europeans	were	 addressed	 in	 Framework	 Programmes	 documents	 as	 «consumers»,	 «workers»,	 «users»,	
after	1993,	with	the	enlargement	of	the	agenda	to	include	the	quality	of	life	and	social	objectives	and	with	





the	 public,	 characterised	 by	 «resistance»	 against	 the	 promoted	 changes,	 and	 they	 pushed	 for	 the	
development	of	«an	innovation	culture»	in	Europe	(CEC,	1995):	










































discourses,	 however,	 mainly	 from	 the	 side	 of	 the	 economic	 analyses,	 the	 aim	 of	 such	 participatory	
experiments	was	not	open	to	collective,	democratic-wise,	shaping	of	political	actions,	but	they	were	meant	











 “Tricks” and inclusive processes 
In	 the	Horizon	2020	 introductory	video,	the	 interaction	of	knowledge	with	society	 is	defined	as	a	
«trick»:	the	smart	approach	to	knowledge	–	defined	as	an	instrument	of	power,	and	a	currency	in	the	global	
economy	–	is	to	make	it	«work	for	you».	The	portrayal	of	a	complex	dynamic	as	a	«trick»	reveals	a	conceptual	









an	 erosion	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 through	 legal	 decisions	 and	 regulations	 (particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	
financial	field)	with	the	weakness	of	the	citizens’	participation	in	EU	decision-making	(Pollack,	2014).	
At	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 Millennium	 a	 rethinking	 of	 the	 EU	 decision-making	 process	 and	 institutional	
functioning		was	set	as	a	priority	by	the	Prodi	Commission,	leading	to	the	publication	in	2001	of	the	White	







However,	 the	 White	 Paper	 also	 recognized	 that	 the	 EU	 multi-level	 structure	 does	 not	 help	 in	





before	 admitting	 them	 in	 the	 debate	 about	 science	 and	 technology	 policies	 (the	 PUS	 approach);	 the	
Eurobarometers	of	the	1990	and	1993	on	Europeans,	science	and	technology	devoted	significant	space	to	
the	 assessment	 of	 the	 public	 understanding	 of	 science,	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 Europeans’	 attitudes	
towards	science	(CEC,	1990;	INRA,	Report	International,	&	CEC,	1993).		
The	 document	 proposing	 the	 European	 Research	 Area	 (CEC,	 2000)	 addressed	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
Europeans’	negative	perception	of	science,	inspiring	«as	much	anguish	as	hope»:	




















and	 how	 to	 «fully	 involve	 society	 in	 seeing	 through	 the	 research	 agenda».	 In	 this	 document,	 the	 issues	





explicitly	articulated	with	 reference	 to	 the	developments	 in	 the	nature	of	S&T	and	of	 its	 impacts	–	 rapid	
changes,	affecting	social	relations,	generating	new	needs	and	challenging	the	«basic	values	and	principles	of	
social	 life»	 –	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 changing	 awareness	 of	 the	 European	 citizens	 regarding	 science	 –	 their	
oscillation	between	confidence	in	science	and	fear	of	technological	risks,	together	with	the	advances	in	the	
«capacity	 among	 the	 better-informed	 and	 better	 educated	members	 of	 the	 public	 to	 apply	 their	 critical	
faculties	to	developments	they	regard	as	being	imposed	rather	than	desired,	together	with	the	erosion	of	





quality	 of	 life	 in	 Europe.	 All	 the	more	 so,	 given	 the	 central	 role	 they	 play	 in	 the	 knowledge-based	
economy	and	society	 that	 the	European	Union	committed	 itself	 to	building	at	 the	Lisbon	European	
Council.	 	 (…)	the	Lisbon	objectives	will	be	achieved	only	by	an	economy	geared	to	 innovation	and	a	
society	fully	committed	to	it.	
The	Action	Plan	politically	positioned	the	topic	of	Science	and	Society	at	the	intersection	of	the	three	










A	 further	 development	 in	 the	 understanding	 and	 governance	of	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 EU	 context	was	
realized	in	preparation	of	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme,	when	a	shift	was	promoted	from	the	label	of	
«Science	and	 Society»	 to	«Science	 in	 Society»,	 and	 such	denomination	was	adopted	 for	 the	 funding	 line	
included	in	FP7	(Stirling,	2006,	emphasis	as	in	the	original):	
The	process	of	‘science	and	governance’,	is	therefore	not	just	one	of	linking	separate	arenas	of	‘science	





to	move	away	 from	an	 idea	of	 engagement	 as	 an	effective	process	of	 information	 transfer,	mainly	 from	










the	 general	 use	 of	 science	 in	 governance.	What	 are	 the	 priorities	 and	 purposes,	 which	 justify	 the	
allocation	of	resources	to	different	areas	of	innovation	or	lines	of	enquiry?	What	are	the	assumptions	





















They	 conclude	 suggesting	 that	 policy	 making	 should	 not	 be	 tempted	 by	 «simple	 or	 mechanical	
solutions»,	but	should	address	«Europe’s	rich	democratic	and	scientific	tradition»,	especially	considering	the	
recent	formulation	of	the	European	Knowledge	Society.		
The	most	 up-to-date	 elaboration	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 science-society	 interplay,	 included	 in	 the	
current	Horizon2020	Framework	Programme,	is	the	«Science	with	and	for	Society»	approach,	where	the	new	





Responsible Research and Innovation.	A	parallel	and	linked	approach	currently	goes	under	the	label	
























research	 and	 innovations,	 creating	 jobs,	 increasing	 social	 welfare	 and	 helping	 to	 avoid	 risks	 of	
misallocation	of	R&D	funds,	as	the	growing	economic	importance	of	green	technologies	across	Europe	
shows.	






Responsible	Research	and	 Innovation	 (RRI)	 implies	 that	 societal	 actors	 (researchers,	 citizens,	 policy	
makers,	 business,	 third	 sector	 organisations,	 etc.)	 work	 together	 during	 the	 whole	 research	 and	
innovation	process	in	order	to	better	align	both	the	process	and	its	outcomes	with	the	values,	needs	
and	expectations	of	society.	
In	 the	 2015	 video	Responsible	 Research	 and	 Innovation:	 aligning	 R&I	with	 European	 society	 (EC,	
2015d)	 citizens’	 engagement	 is	 listed	 after	 ethics,	 science	 education	 and	 open	 access	 as	 one	 of	 the	










Similarly	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Societal	 Challenges,	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 ‘responsibility’	 dimension	 of	





Solving Grand Challenges 
The	emphasis	on	the	definition	of	“Grand	Challenges”	instead	of	abstract	political	strategies,	in	order	
to	focus	the	efforts	and	stimulate	public	support,	has	particularly	grown	in	recent	years,	both	globally	and	in	
Europe.	 In	 the	 EU,	 this	 rhetoric	 has	 gradually	 emerged	 during	 the	 years	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Strategy	 as	 an	
alternative	narrative	to	competitiveness	for	the	research	and	innovation	activities	(Ulnicane,	2016).		
As	 early	 as	 1995,	 the	 task	 force	 on	 research	 and	 industries	 identified	 research	 priorities	 of	 key	
importance	to	European	industry	and	society,	and	FP5	was	designed	and	articulated	around	«key	actions»,	
focusing	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998):	
(…)	 on	 all	 manner	 of	 bottlenecks	 (scientific,	 technological	 and	 socio-economic)	 which	 hamper	 the	
resolution	of	problems	common	to	all	fifteen	Member	States	
However,	the	subsequent	concentration	on	strategical	reforms	(the	ERA	and	Bologna	processes,	and	











poverty	 and	 inequality,	 fertility	 decline	 and	 ageing,	 lifestyle	 and	 communicable	 diseases,	 and	 the	
environmental	challenges:	water,	climate	change	and	biodiversity.	It	is	particularly	interesting	to	notice	the	
challenge-identifying	 method	 reported	 in	 the	 book,	 regarding	 the	 environmental	 priorities:	 the	 authors	
describe	 a	 benchmarking	 process	 of	 the	 Eurobarometers,	 the	 previous	 EU	 strategies,	 and	 a	 number	 of	
international	publications	from	various	bodies,	some	of	them	environment-related,	like	the	United	Nations	






challenges	 was	 introduced	 in	 EU	 official	 documents	 with	 the	 2007	 Green	 Paper	 on	 ERA,	 proposing	 the	
concept	 of	 grand	 challenges	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 facilitate	 the	 involvement	 of	 a	 wider	 spectrum	 of	
stakeholders	in	the	research	agendas	definition	process	(CEC,	2007c):	
Such	a	process	would	allow	European,	national	and	regional	 research	priorities	 to	be	based	on	 the	
systematic	identification	of	major	societal	challenges.	Common	foresight	and	technology	assessment	






























for	 more	 society-driven,	 education-driven,	 industry-driven,	 innovation-driven	 or	 research-driven	
challenges.	 Two	broad	 sets	of	 criteria	 (…)	underpin	 the	 selection	of	 the	Grand	Challenges,	 namely:	
attractiveness	 (broken	 down	 into	 relevance	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 clear	 research	 dimension)	 and	
feasibility.	Each	criterion	requires	in-depth	consideration	in	order	to	address	its	constituent	elements	
and	 issues	 of	 appropriate	 balance	 between	 potentially	 conflicting	 ideals/principles	 (European	 vs.	
global,	scientific	vs.	social	priority;	doability	vs.	ambition).	













in	 the	 following	year	Lund	Declaration,	as	 the	 increase	of	 the	 funds	available	 to	 research	and	 innovation	
sectors	(Lund	Declaration,	2009):		
Europe	needs	 to	mobilize	 substantially	 increased	 investments	 in	 research	and	 innovation	 targeting	
Grand	 Challenges,	 as	 this	 is	 required	 to	meet	 the	 rapidly	 increasing	 global	 competition	 and	 other	
threats	to	our	well-being	and	in	order	to	take	part	in	the	widening	and	deepening	global	cooperation.	























in	 society	 is	 fully	 accepted	 in	modern	 liberal	 democracies.	 The	 sometimes	uneasy	 relationship	 that	
arises	 around	 the	 imagined	 or	 real	 risks	 associated	 with	 scientific-technological	 developments	 is	
acknowledged	and	serious	efforts	are	undertaken	to	include	citizens’	participation	in	deliberative	ways.	




















(JPIs),	 European	 Innovation	 Partnerships	 and	 Knowledge	 and	 Innovation	 Communities.	 However,	 the	
interplay	 among	 these	 platforms	 was	 not	 clearly	 defined,	 sometimes	 raising	 the	 same	 expert	 groups’	
concerns	(Hunter,	Hernani,	Giry,	Danielsen,	&	Antoniou,	2016).		
With	Horizon	 still	 ongoing,	 negotiations	 have	 started	 for	 the	 preparation	of	 the	 next	 Framework	
Programme,	and	it	appears	that	the	Grand	Challenges	approach	will	be	maintained	also	in	FP9;	furthermore,	
the	debate	is	open	on	a	conceptual	remodelling	of	the	metaphor	in	the	case	of	the	FET	(Future	and	Emerging	
Technologies)	 “flagships”	 –	 now	 conceived	 as	 «visionary,	 science-driven,	 large-scale	 research	 initiatives	
addressing	grand	Scientific	and	Technological	(S&T)	challenges»	(EC,	2014).	The	Human	Brain	Project	and	the	





in	public	declarations	 (Kelly,	2017b,	2017c).	Discussion	are	 focusing	on	a	number	of	10	moonshots	 to	be	







Grand/Societal Challenges as political instruments. The	concept	of	Grand/Societal	Challenges,	used	




The	 evolution	 from	 the	 challenges	 identified	 in	 the	 Strauss-Kahn’s	 2004	 report	 to	 the	 H2020	
documents	shows	a	development	from	a	strategical,	political,	 institutional	as	well	as	societal	framing	to	a	
more	 pragmatic,	 techno-scientific	 definition:	 e.g.	 from	 «economic	 and	 social	 change»	 to	 «health,	
demographic	 change	 and	 wellbeing»;	 from	 «ecological	 imbalance»	 to	 «climate	 action,	 environment,	
resource	efficiency	and	raw	materials»;	from	«post	9/11	strategic	reality»	to	«secure	societies	-	protecting	
freedom	and	security	of	Europe	and	its	citizens».	











deliberative	 moment	 is	 postponed,	 and	 it	 is	 exposed	 at	 the	 risk	 of	 working	 as	 a	 surrogate	 of	 public	
participation,	substituting	it	instead	of	facilitating	it.	





promoted	 for	 strategic	 reasons	 and	 that	 society	 has	 to	 adapt.	 Crucial	 distinguishing	 element	 is	 the	
conceptualization	of	citizens:	active	actors	in	the	political	confrontation,	carriers	of	values	and	able	to	take	
decisions	on	the	 future	on	one	side;	passive	 figures,	whose	deficit	of	scientific	knowledge	prevents	 them	
from	being	able	to	make	sound	and	appropriate	choices	on	the	other.	In	the	first	case,	participation	processes	
are	envisaged	in	order	to	ameliorate	decisions,	and	to	take	into	account	value-related	aspects;	in	the	second,	





































In	 view	 of	 their	 science-driven	 nature	 and	 largely	 'bottom-up',	 investigator-driven	 funding	
arrangements,	the	European	scientific	community	will	play	a	strong	role	in	determining	the	avenues	of	
research	followed	under	Horizon	2020.	




As	mentioned,	 a	major	distinction	 can	be	drawn	between	 research	 funding	models	 assigning	 the	
agenda-setting	role	to	governments,	on	the	basis	of	strategic	priorities,	and	models	in	which	the	scientific	




the	 H2020	 establishing	 act	 frames	 its	 contribution	 as	 functional	 «to	 make	 the	 Union's	 research	 and	
innovation	 system	 more	 competitive	 on	 a	 global	 scale»	 (EP	 &	 CEU,	 2013).	 A	 friction	 emerges	 also	 in	








closely	 related	 to	 the	exploitation	of	 ideas	 in	 the	market,	 and	 an	 innovative	approach	 can	be	difficult	 to	
reconcile	with	the	inherent	features	of	basic	research,	whose	practical	outputs,	if	any,	are	often	visible	only	
decades	after	the	ideas	were	conceived.	
The European approach to basic research.	 The	 traditional	 European	approach	 to	 research	 favours,	
with	 the	 relevant	 examples	 of	 the	 big	 laboratories	 established	 in	 the	 post-war	 period,	 applied	 and	
competitiveness-oriented	 research.	 However,	 the	 debate	 around	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 European	 Research	
Council	triggered	a	reflection	of	the	role	of	basic	research	in	the	European	context.	
The	2004	document	Europe	and	basic	research	(CEC,	2004)	acknowledged	such	debate	and	situated	
EU’s	 view	 in	 the	 frame	 of	 the	 «emerging	 knowledge-based	 economy	 and	 society»	 and	 of	 the	 European	
Research	Area,	describing	the	European	vision	against	the	historical	background	of	the	conceptualizations	of	
basic	research	–	an	approach	that	is	very	uncommon	for	Commission’s	communications:	






During	 the	 decades	 which	 followed	 and	 in	 view	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 science	 for	 industrial	







its	 ultimate	 purpose	 (research	 carried	 out	with	 the	 sole	 aim	 of	 increasing	 knowledge);	 its	 distance	 from	
application	(research	on	the	basic	aspects	of	phenomena);	or	the	time	frame	in	which	it	is	situated	(research	
































research	 orientation	 frames	 in	 European	 science	 policy:	 the	 term	 «frontier	 research»,	 instead	 of	 «basic	
research»,	was	proposed,	and	adopted	in	subsequent	Commission’s	accounts,	by	an	ad-hoc	expert	group,	
committed	to	«provide,	by	collecting	and	analysing	existing	data,	a	clear	indication	of	the	types	of	effects	
and	benefits	 that	may	be	expected,	and	their	 scientific	and	economic	significance».	 In	 fact,	 (Harris	et	al.,	
2005):	
classical	distinctions	between	‘basic’	and	‘applied’	research	have	lost	much	of	their	relevance	at	a	time	
when	 emerging	 areas	 of	 science	 and	 technology	 often	 embrace	 substantial	 elements	 of	 both.	 The	
report	 therefore	 adopts	 the	 term	 frontier	 research,	 rather	 than	 basic	 research,	 to	 reflect	 this	 new	
																																								 																				





risky	 endeavour	 that	 involves	 the	 pursuit	 of	 questions	 without	 regard	 for	 established	 disciplinary	
boundaries	or	national	borders.	
In	 other	words,	 the	 concept	 of	 «frontier	 research»	 could	 identify	 fundamental	 research	without	
excluding	the	creation	of	useful	knowledge,	and	embrace	both	the	domains	of	basic	research	and	application-
oriented	activities	(Luukkonen,	2014).	
Not only a different orientation, but also a different rationale for research funding.	Admitting	the	ERC	
idea	 at	 the	 EU-level	 political	 debate	 didn’t	 only	 mean	 discussing	 on	 a	 different	 research	 orientation	
(production	of	 new	knowledge	per	 se),	 but	 involved	 the	development	of	 a	 completely	 new	 rationale	 for	
justifying	research	funding:	while	the	traditional	one	was	targeted	at	‘pre-competitive’	research,	achieved	







Regaining the autonomy of the scientific community: the rise of the ERC 
During	the	‘90s,	the	Framework	Programmes	‘format’	developed	and	consolidated;	however,	the	FP	
growing	 administrative	 burden	 involved	 also	 a	 significant	 institutional	 inertia,	 and	 it	 proved	 difficult	 to	
change	 its	 procedures,	 along	 with	 its	 rationale	 for	 research	 funding.	 The	 success	 of	 the	 Framework	
Programmes	led	to	their	broadening	in	scale	and	scope,	but	it	prevented	from	changing	the	orientation	and	
procedure	of	research	policy111.	




















he	 destroyed	 the	 core	 basics	 of	 the	 FP	 format:	 instead	 of	 foresight,	 ‘in	 matching	 long-term	




























A	 further	 expert	 group	was	 set	 up	 in	 2004	 to	 study	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 ERC	 to	 the	 Union’s	
objective	of	competitiveness:	the	result	was	the	report,	issued	in	early	2005,	proposing	the	adoption	of	the	





















society	 and	 meet	 the	 target,	 set	 out	 by	 the	 European	 Council	 in	 Lisbon,	 of	 becoming	 the	 most	
competitive	and	dynamic	knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world,	capable	of	sustainable	economic	
growth	with	more	and	better	jobs	and	greater	social	cohesion.		


















States,	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	national	 differences;	 in	 EU	 research	policy	 lingo,	mentioning	 «excellence»	
signaled	the	positioning	in	a	sector	of	research	funding	where	the	juste	retour	criterion	–	the	Member	States	













Relying	 on	 the	 peer-review	 method	 positioned	 the	 ERC	 patently	 under	 the	 ‘jurisdiction’	 of	 the	
scientific	community’s	norms	and	values,	enforcing	the	original	call	of	ERC	advocates	to	re-establish	them	at	
the	EU	research	policy	level.	







































the	ERC	 funds	directly.	ERC-funded	projects	and	 researchers	 set	a	clear	and	 inspirational	 target	 for	




most	 attractive	 conditions	 for	 top	 researchers.	 And	 the	 ability	 of	 national	 systems	 and	 individual	
research	institutions	to	attract	and	host	ERC	grant-winners	sets	a	benchmark	allowing	them	to	assess	
their	 relative	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 and	 reform	 their	 policies	 and	 practices	 accordingly.	 ERC	
funding	is	therefore	in	addition	to	ongoing	efforts	at	Union,	national	and	regional	level	to	reform,	build	
capacity	and	unlock	the	full	potential	and	attractiveness	of	the	European	research	system.		








The ERC as a political instrument 
According	to	the	described	representation	in	policy	documents,	the	ERC	appears	framed	in	a	double-
face	depiction:	the	documents	describing	it	‘from	outside’,	i.e.	presenting	it	to	the	public,	or	inserting	it	in	





political	 community,	 given	 EU’s	 history	 of	 grounding	 research	 to	 competitiveness	 and	 growth;	 indeed,	
another	key	feature	of	the	ERC,	accompanying	excellence,	autonomy	and	transparency,	was	efficiency,	and	
we	have	already	seen	how	this	concept	resonates	with	measurability	and	accountability	of	research.	That	
















Tensions in the European vision of scientific research 















transforming	knowledge	 into	action,	Europe’s	 citizens	are	better	off,	 rather	 than	worse	off,	 in	 that	
distant	future.	
The	 report,	 titled	The	Knowledge	Future:	 Intelligent	policy	choices	 for	Europe	2050	projected	 two	































science	 and	 society	 –	 is	 addressed	 depicting	 a	 successful	 future	 where	 the	 regions	 and	 cities	 represent	
«Europe’s	 growing	 laboratories	 of	 democracy»	 and	 are	 described	 as	 places	 of	 «community	 identity	 and	
involvement».		
The	areas	pertaining	to	basic	science	and	to	the	scientific	community	support	–	highlighted	in	the	
pure-science	 frame	 –	 are	 presented	 as	 Europe’s	 leading	 research	 sectors:	 universities	 are	 «renowned»,	
research	 infrastructures	 are	 «the	new	 cathedrals»	of	 science115	 and	 frontier	 science,	 administered	by	 an	
«enlarged»	ERC,	is	the	leading	research	trend.	The	funding	method	is	competitive,	but	the	possibly	arising	
inequalities	are	compensated	through	structural	funds.		
In	 the	 failure	scenario,	conversely,	 inequalities	are	dominating:	between	regions,	skilled	and	non-


















actors	 and	 issues.	 Each	 frame	 materialised	 in	 specific	 funding	 lines	 inside	 Framework	 Programmes:	

















































































































































































Indeed,	 a	 research	 topic	 oriented	 to	 industrial	 development	 may	 well	 be	 disrespectful	 of	
environmental	precautions,	or	be	 reluctant	 to	 include	 the	citizens	at	an	early	design	stage	 to	discuss	 the	































The	 «free	 and	 united	 Europe»	 emerging	 from	 the	 defeat	 of	 totalitarianism	 needed	 to	 be	 based,	
according	to	the	authors	of	the	Ventotene	Manifesto,	on	the	realization	of	substantial	–	and	not	only	formal	










advancement	 of	 knowledge	 itself	 (see	 Table	 16).	Moreover,	 this	 work	 recognised	 and	 described	 several	






of	economic	analyses,	which	 identified	 in	the	 lack	of	 innovation	the	motivation	of	the	 insufficient	growth	
																																								 																				











was	 set	 as	 a	 priority	 in	 the	 current	 Europe2020	 growth	 strategy	 and	 the	 Framework	 Programme	 is	 built	
around	 the	 realization	 of	 an	 «Innovation	 Union».	 However,	 innovation,	 despite	 the	 term’s	 openness	 of	
meanings,	in	the	political	lingo	is	properly	denoting	an	economic	target:	the	innovation	frame,	based	on	the	
contribution	of	R&D	to	growth,	influences	policy	discourses,	notably	favouring	practical,	measurable	research	














long-established	 scientific	 community’s	 method	 of	 self-management,	 especially	 for	 what	 concerns	 the	




funding	 model:	 while	 the	 Innovation	 and	 Societal	 frames	 are	 conceived	 as	 functional	 to	 the	 strategic	
objectives	 of	 the	 Union,	 the	 ERC	 refuses	 to	 apply	 any	 EU-relevant	 criterion	 –	 like	 a	 cohesion-oriented	
distribution	of	funds,	or	the	principle	of	juste	retour	–	;	moreover	ERC	projects	are	selected	by	means	of	the	
peer-review	mechanism,	totally	 internal	 to	the	scientific	community.	From	the	analysis	of	 the	documents	
emerges	that,	while	the	ERC	is	promoted	with	an	abiding	reference	to	high	quality,	excellent	science,	the	












growth	 (see	 Table	 13).	 In	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	Millennium	 the	 confrontation	 between	 these	 two	major	
orientations	 evolved	 towards	 the	 second	 conceptual	 pole,	with	 the	 affirmation	 of	 innovation	 as	 the	 key	
overarching	concept	of	research	policy,	the	weakening	of	social	and	citizens’	participation	instances	and	the	
strengthening	of	the	accent	on	efficiency	and	impact	of	the	research	system.	
Although,	 however,	 the	 innovation	 frame	 can	 be	 currently	 identified	 as	 the	 principal	 axis	 of	 EU	
research	 policies,	 the	 other	 perspectives	 are	 still	 visible	 and	 incorporated	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 science	
funding,	 notwithstanding	 their	 points	 of	 tension,	 and	 they	 are	engaged	 in	 an	enduring	 struggle	over	 the	
choice	and	framing	of	issues.	
The temptation of reductionisms 
The	tripartite	articulation	of	Horizon	2020	is	the	most	visible	effect	of	the	struggle	over	the	framing	
of	European	research	policies.	Defined	by	the	Commission	as	«distinct,	yet	mutually	reinforcing»	(EC,	2011a),	
the	 three	perspectives	 conversely	 show,	 as	mentioned,	multiple	points	of	 tension,	 originating	 from	 their	
diverse	founding	principles	and	promoted	orientations.	
Where	 the	subjects	 lie	at	 the	 intersection	of	multiple	understandings	–	 like	 the	citizens’	 role	and	
characterization,	and	the	choice	of	societal	concerns	to	be	addressed	by	scientific	research	–	critical	points	


























Quality	of	 life,	 in	 European	discourses,	 is	 repeatedly	 connected	with	 the	 generation	of	 economic	
wealth:	 as	mentioned,	 this	 long-standing	position	 is	 enhanced	 in	 the	 innovation	 frame,	 and	 the	 complex	
interplay	of	social,	cultural	and	economic	factors	affecting	well-being	and	personal	fulfillment	is	frequently	
reduced	to	the	sole	economic	dimension.	Performance,	efficiency	and	impact	are	the	evaluation	criteria	of	
R&D.	Furthermore,	economic	analyses	 repeatedly	 invoke	 fears	of	 social	 failures	 to	 support	 the	proposed	















A climate conducive to a democratic confrontation on European shared values 
The	 temptation	 to	 rely	on	 reductionist	perspectives	 in	European	 research	policies,	 a	 symptom	of	
“democratic	fatigue”120,	is	grounded	to	long-term	historical	and	political	roots.		
First	 of	 all,	 the	 European	 Communities	 were	 primarily	 set	 as	 internal	markets,	 in	 the	 respective	
sectors:	against	the	reluctance	of	states	to	cede	sovereignty,	the	founding	fathers	of	Europe	trusted	that	de	
facto	collaborations,	in	fields	perceived	as	politically	neutral,	would	have	led	in	the	long	term	to	complete	
political	 realisations.	 The	 confrontation	 between	 centralist	 and	 intergovernmental	models	 of	 integration	
continued	over	the	years,	giving	rise	to	the	peculiar	mixture	of	institutions	of	the	European	Union.	The	formal	
political	unification	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	didn’t	conclude	the	process,	although	it	represented	a	turning	
point	 for	 European	policies,	 included,	 as	 seen,	 the	 field	of	 knowledge	production,	 from	 that	moment	on	
embedded	in	the	wider	realm	of	social	and	political,	as	well	as	economic,	policies.	Anyway,	as	mentioned,	





the	 emphasis	 on	 competitiveness,	 markets	 mechanisms	 and	 private	 actors	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 public	
interventions.	 Such	 influence	 certainly	 increased	 after	 the	 1989	 fall	 of	 the	 Berlin	 wall,	 with	 the	 general	
Western	shift	towards	liberal	politics,	promoted	also	by	economic	institutions	like	the	OCED.	The	far	roots	of	
the	European	 inclination	 towards	 liberal	 and	 capitalistic	 policy	models,	 also	 in	 the	 scientific	 field,	 can	be	
ascribed,	as	argued	by	the	historian	John	Krige,	to	the	US	inclination	in	post-war	Europe	to	contribute	to	the	
reconstruction	of	science	in	Europe	as	a	dimension	of	a	wider	strategy	to	«promote	American	values	and	



































properly	acknowledged	and	explored,	 the	different	visions	may	 represent	 fruitful	 seeds	of	confrontation,	





















I	am	also	particularly	grateful	 to	Dr.	Etiennette	Auffray	and	 to	all	 the	supervisors,	 colleagues	and	
friends	 of	 the	 Lab	 27	 at	 CERN	 for	 the	 precious	 experience	 of	 working	 in	 such	 a	 unique	 and	 stimulating	
environment	and	for	the	frequent	confrontations	on	the	nature	of	science,	on	the	role	of	research	and	on	
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